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1

The Arah oil producing countries, following years
of a stalemate in the Arab-Israeli dispute,- decided to
put their oil resource in the service of the Arab cause
using it as an instrument of pressure against the West.
Their objective was to induce a change in the Western
world Middle East policy and to work toward achieving a
lasting and peaceful solution for the Arab-Israeli problem.
The purpose of this thesis is to show that the ap
plication of Arab oil diplomacy has been effective into
producing a more even handed policy in the area, and into
breaking the deadlock in the search for peace.
Chapter I deals with the backgrounds to. Middle East
oil and the factors that led to the creation of OPEC..
Chapter II discusses OPEC in its early.years and
then focuses on the early Arab oil diplomacy attempts.
Chapter III examines the oil embargo of 1973.
Chapter IV deals with the effect of the 1973 Arab
oil embargo on the Western world and Japan.
Chapter V examines the question of future embargoes
and the possibility of American intervention in the area.
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If one is to be anybody in the world oil business,
one must have a footing in the Middle East.
Jean Paul Getty

1
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'CHAPTER I
MIDDLE EAST OIL
THE CREATION OF OPEC
Oil is the most important source of energy availa
ble in the world today.

Without it the industrial econo

mies of the developed as well as the developing nations will
be highly jeopardized.

It has become the vein of life that

runs through almost every facet of the world in which we
live today.
The age of petroleum began when Edwin Drake, an American, struck oil in the State of Pennsylvania in the year
1859*

Following its discovery and until the turn of the

century, it was mostly used in filling lamps and in some
forms of heating.
With the beginning of the 20th Century, the demand
for oil began to increase dramatically.
era had just begun.

The automobile

World War I was another development

that drew attention to the tremendous importance of oil.
"A drop of oil," said Clemenceau, "is worth a drop of
blood. m1
The sharp increase in oil usage was specially evi
dent in the U.S.

In the post war years a whole new way of

^Anthony Sampson, The Seven Sisters (New Yorks The
Viking Press, 1975)» p. 6CL

2
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life was formed based on cheap oil.

The ability to have

cars and to travel cheaply for every individual, abundant
inexpensive electricity and cheap heating, all became part
of turning the American dream into reality.

By the year

1929, the U.S. was using petroleum for one third of its
total energy consumption.
doubled.

Twenty years later that figure

Today the U.S. uses one third of the world en*-.

ergy to fulfil its needs.'*'
Up until World War I, the United States was relying
in meeting its energy needs on oil found inside the coun
try; huge deposits were discovered from the second part
of the 19th Century onward.

Standard Oil was founded by

John D. Rockefeller in 1870. By 1880, Rockefeller’s Stand
ard came to dominate the domestic oil industry in the U.S.
eliminating virtually all competition.

Ruth Knowles writes

of the influence of Rockefeller and his Standard:
How Rockefeller achieved his monopoly
makes astonishing reading in the light
of present-day business ethics and laws.
Secret rebates from railroads, extinc
tion of one small company after another,
intimidation, bribery, collusion, decep
tion-even his apologists admit his use
of all these weapons, and his critics
accuse him of far worse.

^•Seeniappan Manoharan, The Oil Crisis: End of. an
era (New Delhi: S. Chand and Co. Ltd., 197^)» p. 2 5.
...... 2R.u.th .Sh.eId.on..Knowles*...LThe Greatest Gamblers: The
Epic of American Oil Exploration (New York: McGraw-Hill
Book Co,, Inc., 1959)» p. l6«
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Rockefeller's monopoly was not centered on trying
to control the oil fields, hut rather was evident in his
attempts to control all other aspects connected with the in
dustry.

Thus he had a firm hold on pipelines, refining,

transportation facilities, and the marketing of petroleum.
By the beginning of this century, Rockefeller's ambitions
turned into monopolizing the world market as well.

Thus he

ventured into Europe, Asia (oil for the lamps of China) and
Latin America.'1' These ventures for global control were un
dermined by challenges from some European oil companies
particularly a joint firm known as Royal Dutch-Shell.
The first World War was undoubtedly the main event
that brought about the full realization of the great import
ance of oil.

The big Western powers emerged from the war

fully aware of the importance of oil for survival.• Herbert
Feis, an adviser to the State Department, commenting on the
vitality of oil, stated: "That an adequate supply of oil was
a vital element in military power, was one of the most eas
ily read lessons of the war."2

"The Allies,", said Lord

Curzon in what became a famous quotation, "floated to vic
tory on a wave of oil."^

oil was essential for victory in

"Kjoe Stork, Middle East Oil and the Energy Crisis
(New York: Monthly Review Press, 1975)» p. 7*

2

Herbert Feis, Seen From E.A.: Three International
Episodes (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 19*17), p. 94.
o
Sampson, Op. Cit.. p. 60.
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times of war.
peace.

It was also just as essential in times of

Thus the great competition for the control of oil,

wherever'it was found, "began.
The Middle East was shattered after World War I.
The Allies had promised the Arab countries their independ
ence if they revolted against the Ottoman rule and sided
with them.
The Allies won the war but their intentions were to
keep the region under their control.
strategically very important.

The Middle East was

In addition, oil was discov

ered in various parts of the area and they wanted to have
control over this precious resource.
The Arab countries were divided at the end of the
war between the two western powers, Britain and France.
Zionism began to be an issue that alarmed the Arab nation
alists after the Balfour declaration promised the Jews to
establish a homeland for them in Palestine in 1917.
nationalism began to gain momentum.

Arab

As for the big Western

powers, namely the British and the French, their immediate
concern was to control the Arab countries both politically
and economically, in order to ensure their complete access
to the oil in the region.1
In 1901, William D'Arcy, a British engineer, was
granted the rights to "search for, obtain, exploit, develop,

^tork, Op. Cit., p. 8 .
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and render suitable for trade, carry away and sell natural
gas, petroleum, asphalt and ozocerite throughout the whole
extent of the Persian Empire,"^ However, when his efforts
to strike up oil ended in failure, the British Admirality
convinced the British-owned Burmah Oil Company to come to
the aid of D*Arcy, thereby enabling the search to continue.
The two parties formed a syndicate which became the base
for the Anglo-Persian Oil Company, later known as British
Petroleum (BP).

Later through the efforts of Winston

Churchill, the then First Lord of the Admirality, the Brit
ish Government bought 51 percent of the company's total
shares,
American interest in the oil of the Middle East re
gion was perceived with extreme suspicion by Britain,

The

British were adamant on keeping the Americans out of the
oil picture.

They considered the Middle East their domain

and were determined to keep the competition out.
Around the same time that Britain obtained the Per
sian Concession, it was able to get its hands over another
vastly important oil concession covering the whole region
of Iraq,

Britain had mandate powers over Iraq which was

inherited from the Ottoman Empire and which proved to be one
of the richest oil countries in the world.
The French were also siding with the British in try-

3-Ibid.
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ing to thwart American efforts for establishing a foothold
in the Middle East oil regions.,. The main purpose of the
San Remo Agreement which was signed in 1920 between the
British and the French was to keep the American oil compa
nies out of the area that was under the British and the
French mandate.
To the Americans, this situation was unbearable.
U.S. fuels represented 80 percent of the total oil that was
needed by the Allies in World War I and thereby its contri
bution to winning the Allied victory was decisive.

The U.S.

had helped win the war and it wanted a share of' the Middle
East spoils.

The post war behavior of the French and the

British seemed one of flagrant ingratitude.

It disturbed

the U.S. to see that these powers were using their capaci
ties as mandate powers to prevent American companies from
entering the region under their control.
oil was rising in the U.S.

The need for more

Domestically, the oil supplies

did not seem sufficient to fulfil the needs for the future.
There seemed to be a definite need to rely on foreign oil
to supplement the dwindling domestic supplies.^- The Ameri
can navy was converting from the use of coal to oil and the
general demand on the national market was increasing rapid
ly.

It was intolerable for the U.S. to be excluded from

John A. DeNovo, "The Movement for an Aggressive
American Oil Policy Abroad, 1918-1920," American Histori
cal Review. Vol. 6l, No. ^ (July 1956), p. 862.
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what seemed to he the natural outcome of reaping the spoils
of the war.
Further, the U.S. feared British control over oil
resources and any plans to monopolize them.

Such fears

were played upon hy high British official's statements on
this issue.

One such statement was a declaration hy Walter

Hume long, First Lord of the Admirality, that "if we secure
the supplies of oil now available in the world we can do
what we like."1

A British newspaper boasted: "Britain will

soon he able to do to America what Standard Oil once did
2
to the rest of the world— hold it up to ransom."
The American oil companies were not allowed to pros
pect for oil in the Middle East region.
efforts were completely in vain.

Their continuous

Condemning "this iniqui-

3

tous carve up" of the Middle East area, the companies ap
pealed to President Wilson and to the State Department ask
ing for immediate action.
Commenting on the British position, Wilson noted :
"It is evident to me that we are on the eve of a commercial
war of the severest sort and I am afraid that Great Britain
will prove capable of as great commercial savagery as Germany

Ibid., p. 860.

2

quoted in Leonard Mosley, Power Play: Oil in the
Middle East (New York: Random House, 1973)» p. 45.
3
Ibid., p. 44.
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has displayed for so many years in her competitive methods."1
The State Department stepped in on behalf of the
American oil companies.

Refusing to recognize the San-

Remo Agreement, it informed the British that the U.S. would
continue to uphold the "Open Door Policy"

which is "the
2
broad principle of equality of commercial opportunity" to
all territories acquired in the war. This policy was origi
nally formulated in relation;

to concessions in China.

Protesting the exclusion of American oil companies
from the Middle East area and refusing to accept Britain's
monopoly for its nationals in this field, the State Depart
ment emphasized equality of treatment for all nations.

It

cited the fact over and again that Americans had contribut
ed to the Allied powers victory and should not be excluded
from a share in the resources under the mandate.
Finally and following many years of diplomatic and
commercial negotiations and pressuring from the State De
partment and American officials, the British and the French
gave in.

American oil companies were able in 1928, to

formally enter the oil-territories of the Middle East.where
by they obtained a *23.75 percent interest in the Iraq Petro
leum Company.

In 193^» Gulf was able to obtain a conces

sion together with the Anglo-Persian Company covering the
1
DeNovo, Op. Cit., pp. 858-859.
2
Stork, Op. Cit., p. 21.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

whole sheikdom of Kuwait.

In 1936, Standard Oil of Cali

fornia got the oil concessions in Bahrain.

Then together

with Texaco, Standard managed to get a most important con
cession that opened up all of the country of Saudi Arabia
for them under the names the Arabian American Oil Company,
known as ARAMCO.
The American companies were finally in.

Soon after

their entry into the Middle East, they acquired larger
holdings and bigger operations than those of the British
or the French.1 It was a struggle from then onward, not
to let them take over completely.
It was through the State Department efforts that
the doors to Middle East oil finally swung open for the
American oil companies.

This special relationship that

existed with the State Department continued over the years.
Since that time, the State Department has come to the aid
of the companies in trying to secure privilges for them
whenever and wherever the opportunity arises. Thus it has
intervened on numerous occasions to obtain further bene
fits for these companies.
This special relationship between the oil companies
and their parent country is not unique to the U.S.

!The

relationship between the British oil companies and the
French oil companies, and their respective governments
I
DeNovo, Op. Cit., p. 876.
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is

also close.

The same is true in Italy and Japan.

The oil companies operating on the oil scene today
can be divided into two main groups.

The first group con

sists of seven major international companies.

By 1970,

these seven major companies were controlling close to 80
percent of the world's crude oil,1
Of these giants, dubbed as the Seven Sisters in the
oil business, five are American : Standard Oil Company of
New Jersey (Exxon), Texaco, Gulf Oil Corporation (Gulf),
Standard Oil Company of California (Socal), Mobil Oil Corp
oration (Mobil),

One is British: British Petroleum (BP),

and one is Anglo-Dutch: Royal-Dutch Shell (Shell).

The

French Company: Compagnie Francaise des Petroles is some2
times included among the International Companies,
The second group is composed of around thirty com
panies referred to sometime as "International Minors."
According to Micheal Tanzer, they are called minors,
,.,depending on whether the stress is on
their relative newness or their relative
minor positions. The newcomers are prima
rily U.S. firms such as Standard Oil of
California, Phillips Petroleum, Continen
tal Oil, Atlantic Refining, Union Oil,
etc.... However, there are also important
newcomers from other countries such as .

^Zuhair Mikdashi, The Community of Oil Exporting
Countries (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press,
1972), p. 35,

2

Ibid,, pp. 35-36.
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the Japanese-Arabian Oil Company and the
,
Entre Nazionali Indrocrubari (ENI)of Italy.
The entry of the oil companies in the Middle East
region was made through concession agreements between the
oil producing nations and the oil companies with the bless
ings and frequent interference of Western countries.

Today

these concessions have acquired a negative connotation in
the Middle East because they were formulated heavily in
favor, of the concessionaires.

They are looked upon as an

other form of exploitation, of extracting the riches of the
underdeveloped nations by the colonial or ex-colonial pow
ers,

Many Arab observers argued that these concessions were

granted under duress, at a time when these countries were
either unsophisticated, weak, or totally subjected to the
colonial powers, and could not exercise in any fashion
their freedom of action.

Quite often the texts of these

concessions were ambiguous and unclear.

It is only when

these countries achieve their independence that they start
reviewing the concession agreements only to find they are
2
unjust and exploitative.
Sheikh Mana Saeed al-Otaiba, the Oil Minister of the
United Arab Emirates, talks of the way these concessions

"^Michael Tanzer, The Political Economy of the Inter
national Oil Companies and the Underdeveloped Countries
(Boston: Beacon Press, 1 9 7 0 ) , p, 3 0 ,
2
Abdul Amir Kubbah, OPEC, Past and Present (Vienna:
Petro-Economic Research Cen:Ere7l97ziTr^pi~9^nri— ‘
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were granted:
The large oil concessions, particularly in
the Middle East, were granted under politi
cal and social conditions that were unfavor
able for the producing countries, since most
of them at the time did not exercise full
sovereignty rights over their territories
or over their natural resources, moreover,
the nationals of such countries lacked the
knowledge and experience necessary for the
proper evaluation of the real value of the oil
rights granted. Iraq for instance was threat
ened with the dismemberment of the Mosul prov
ince from its territory unless the govern
ment agreed to grant a concession to the then
Turkish Petroleum Company, later named Iraq
Petroleum Company (IPC).l
Theodore Moran in his statement before the Church
Committee in its investigation of the international oil
companies discusses the position of the oil states at the
time they grant the concessions:
Initial investments in resource extraction
were undertaken with only the most primi
tive attempts at bargaining. When the in
ternational oil companies first approached
...king Ibn Saud of Saudi Arabia, they were
invited to draft their own petroleum leg
islation, 2
According to Moran, governments were ill equipped
to judge adequately how much they could get from the com
panies so "they initially accept terms heavily weighted in
favor of the foreign investor,"

3

•^Mana Saeed al-Otaiba, OPEC and the Petroleum In
dustry (New York: John Wiley and Sons, Inc,, 1975)» P» 29,
2
Church Committee Hearings. 93rd Congress, First
Session, 1973t p. 299.
3Ibid., p. 297.
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When these companies were given the exclusive rights
to "search for, obtain, exploit, develop, render suitable
for trade, carry away and sell" petroleum as it was stated
in the Iranian concession and other Middle East concessions
they were actually allowed extraordinary rights and privi
leges,

In the words of a top oil official, these conces

sions were equated with a "transfer of sovereignty."

So

vast was the power of the concessionaires that they were able to "topple a government or set up another one,"-1The terms of these concessions were extremely bene
ficial to the oil companies.

Their duration ranged be

tween 60-75 years and in some cases up to 100 years.
area they covered was enormous.

The

Some concessions covered

all the country as it was the case in Iraq, Bahrain and
Kuwait,

Some others covered the majority of the land as

it was the case of Saudi Arabia and Iran.

Furthermore, the

concession agreements carried no provisions for relinquisho
ing unexplored territories by the companies.
It took
lengthy negotiations many years .later between the oil com
panies and the host countries before the rights to explore
in these territories were given up.
Due to the privileges obtained by the oil companies,
the oil countries of the Middle East were unable to par-

1Mikdashi, Op, Cit., p. 43,
p

Manoharan, Op. Cit., p, 48.
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ticipate in any of the general policies dealing with this
vital resource,

The companies made the decision as to

where and when to explore for oil; it was the companies
that decided the rate of development of the oil when it
was found and again it was the companies that had total
control over prices.1

In the words of Sheikh Abdullah

Traiki, Saudi Arabia's first

Oil Minister, the oil com2
panies "treat us like children."
In 1959 and i960 the oil companies announced, with
out prior consultation with the host countries, two cuts
in the posted price of crude oil, citing the slumping of
oil prices as a reason.
The first price reduction of eighteen cents a barrel was announced in February 1959.

That meant that the

oil producing countries in the Middle East would lose about
10 percent of their earnings.

Then in August i960 the oil

companies announced a further reduction of 10 cents a bar
rel, thereby diminishing the income of the oil countries
even more.

^ankwart A, Rustow and John F, Mungo, OPEC: Success and Prospects (New York: New York University Press,
1976), p. 3.
2
Michael Tanzer, The Energy Crisis: World Struggle
for Power and Wealth (New York: Monthly Review Press, 197^),
P. 63.
^Sampson, Op. Cit.. p. 157.
Slbid.. p. 158,
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The first price reduction prompted the oil coun
tries to rally their forces in the face of the oil compa
nies.

Thus in April 1959» "the First Arab Oil Congress met

in Cairo, with Iran and Venezuela joining the meetings as
observers.

During the Congress, several important meetings

took place between the representatives of two prominent oil
countries, Saudi Arabia and Venezuela.

According to Dr,

Juan Pablo Perez Alfonzo, Venezuela’s Minister of Mines
and Hydrocarbons, these informal meetings with Sheikh Abd
ullah Tariki, the Saudi Oil Minister, led to a secret genleman's agreement that formed the basis behind the creation,
of OPEC.1

The Congress ended with the passing of a recom

mendation that was aimed at the oil companies.

This recom

mendation asked that no change in the prices of crude oil
sould be allowed prior to discussing it with the host coun
tries.2
The second price cut was received with much more fu
ry and seemed to ionite the oil producers into a plan to
fight back.

On September 9» I960 a meeting was called for

in Baghdad at the invitation of the Iraqi government.

The

five largest oil producers: Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Iraq (all
Arab countries) and Venezuela and Iran attended.

According

1Ibid.
2Mikdashi, Op. Cit., p, 32.
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to one Arab observer, Fuad Itayims "It was quite clear from
the start that the price cuts might precipitate the estab
lishment of what some delegate chose to call 'a cartel to
confront the cartel.'

It had precisely that effect,"'1’

On September 1^, i960, the delegates decided to form
a permanent organization under the name: Organization of
Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC).

OPEC's creation

marks the turning point for the oil producing countries in
their relations with the oil companies and in their efforts
to assume control over their vital resource.

^Sampson, Op. Cit.. p. 161,
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They do not tell us what is going on outside the
production phase.

They say this is complicated and is the

"business of the parent companies. They treat us like children.
Abdullah Tariki, 1959

We have formed a very exclusive club.... Between us
we control 90% of crude exports to world markets and we are
now united.

We are making history.
Perez Alfonzo, i960

18
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CHAPTER II

OPEC IN THE SIXTIES
FIRST ATTEMPTS AT OIL DIPLOMACY
The aims of the newly founded organization were
stated clearly by the delegates in their first resolution
passed at the meeting in Baghdad:
Members can no longer remain indifferent to
the attitude heretofore adopted by the Oil
Companies in effecting price modification.
Members shall demand that Oil Companies
maintain their prices steady and free from
all unnecessary fluctuations; Members shall
endeavour by all means available to them,
to restore present prices to the levels pre
vailing before the reductions; they shall
ensure that if any new circumstances arise
which in the estimation of the Oil Compa
nies necessitate price modifications, the
said Companies shall enter into consulta
tion with the Member or Members affected
,
in order to fully explain the circumstances.x
This resolution shows that the objectives of the
oil countries were mainly the restoration of oil prices
to their level before the reductions were made and the pre
venting of any further price cutbacks by the companies.
The reductions effected by the oil companies undermined
the development programs of the oil nations and were lead
ing, according to Sheikh Mana Saeed al-Otaiba, the United
Arab Emirates Oil Minister, to a dislocation detrimental

1OPEC, Resolution 1,1
19
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to their economies.1 The revenues from the sale of oil were
and still are the main source of income for the oil coun
tries.

As OPEC stated in another resolution, the oil in

dustry was viewed as "having the character of a public uti
lity^ upon which depended their development and moderniza
tion plans.
The question is asked if OPEC would have come into
existence had it not been for the climate that the oil
companies had created?

In the words of one oil analysts

"Without the price cuts... the Organization of Petroleum
Exporting Countries would almost certainly not have come
into being at that time."^

There is no doubt

that

confronted with the kind of unity that the oil companies
displayed on the price issue, the oil nations were forced
to unify as well.

As one Kuwaiti official commented,"OPEC

could not have happened without the oil cartel.
took a leaf from the oil companies' book.

We just

The victim-had

learnt the lesson."
The membership of OPEC was enlarged to include eight
other oil nations.

In addition to the original members:

■^al-Otaiba, Op. Cit., pp. 52-53.
^OPEC, Resolution IV,32,

3

—

«J.E. Hartshorn, Politics and World Oil Economics:
An Account of the International bil Industry and its Poli
tical Environment. 2nd ed. (New York: Praeger, 1962), p, 23.
Ij,
Sampson, Op. Cit., p. 162.
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Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Iraq, Venezuela and Iran, Qatar be
came a member in 19^1, Indonesia and Libya in 19^2, AbuDhabi in 1967, Algeria in 1969* Nigeria in 1971* Ecuador
in 1973 and Gabon in 1975. raising the total membership
to thirteen countries.
The OPEC nations, in their dealings with the com
panies, opted for the path of individual negotiations in
stead of collective negotiations.

Such strategy was adopt

ed in all the matters that were of importance to the mem
bers of OPEC.

These matters included the restoration of

prices, control of production and the question of royal-.-,
ties.

This strategy proved to be faulty since it hardly

accomplished anything for the members of the newly found
ed organization, throughout the sixties.1
reductions were never cancelled.

In fact the price

OPEC had later to give

up its claim for price restoration altogether.

It was not

until the 1970, when the oil scene had changed considers
ably, that OPEC nations were able to obtain better prices
for their oil.
On the issue of regulation of production, OPEC
noted in its very first resolution that "...Members shall
study and formulate a system to ensure the stabilization

1Abbas Alnasrawi, "Collective Bargaining Power in
OPEC," Journal of World Trade Law (March/April, 1973)»
p. 190.
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of prices, by among other means, the regulation of produc
tion. .. ,"1
Instead of reducing the level of production and
consequently the amount of oil on the market as they had
called for in their resolution, the oil nations actually
stepped up their production.

The introuduction of the new

independent oil companies (outside the seven sisters) into'
the unexplored fields of the region, did not help the pic
ture at all. Neither did the national oil companies owned
and operated by the oil producing countries themselves.
These companies had access to high quantities of crude oil
which they turned around and sold to the big companies on
the intemaltional scene.

This policy proved to be damag

ing to OPEC's main objective of restoring the August i960
oil prices.
The only country among the OPEC members that was in
favor of the idea of prorationing was Venezuela.

Its Min

ister of Mines and Hydrocarbon, Dr. Perez Alfonso, was an
advocate of the idea from the time of OPEC’s creation. His
friend Dr, Abdullah Tariki, the Saudi Oil Minister was also
in favor of reducing production even though the Saudi gov
ernment was not. The rest of the OPEC nation felt that
such a policy would be hurtful.

They were interested in

maximizing their revenues in order to finance their devel

^OPEC, Resolution 1,1.
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To decrease production could mean jeopardiz

ing these plans, a risk these countries were unwilling or
unable to take.
Naturally the major oil companies who were in con
trol of approximately 85 percent of oil exports from the
OPEC area, were against any regulation of production.1
Such a policy would be contrary to their interests.

It

meant a loosening of their tight grip over the industry and
their own operations.

In the words of the executive vice-

president of Mobil, if such a policy is exercised "...the
industry would loose the flexibility and the freedom of
choice which it now enjoys."*

What is ironic is that while

the major American oil companies were showing clear opposi
tion to OPEC prorationing, they were "all supporters publicly of prorationing in the United States.
Even though OPEC adopted a production program in
its Ninth Conference held in Libya in 1965 which asked for
"rational increases in production from the OPEC area to
meet estimated increases in world demand at e.quitable price
l e v e l s , t h e countries involved refused to abide by this
program.

.Two years later, the idea, of control over pro

■4/Iikdashi, Op. Cit., p. 123.
2Ibid., p. 12**.
3Ibid., p. 125.
^OPEC, Resolution IV. 6l.
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duction as a way "to ensure the stabilization of prices,"
was shelved indefinitely.

OPEC began to channel all its

efforts toward the issue of royalty payment.
Royalties were paid by the oil companies to the
host countries for the privilges of exploiting their nat
ural resource.

OPEC members were getting 12,5 percent of

the price per barrel as royalty payment.

This amount was

looked upon by the oil companies as a credit which was in
cluded in the oil governments’ 50 percent share of the rev
enues.

In 1962, OPEC adopted a resolution requesting that

royalty payments are considered as a cost to be paid to
the host governments and not as "a credit against income
tax liability."1
Once again OPEC chose the path ofindividual country-company negotiations and once againit was proven
effective.

in

Finally, following two years of negotiations,

an agreement that was acceptable to the oil companies was
concluded.

In this agreement the host countries had to
2
accept certain discounts off posted prices.
Furthermore
the oil_ countries were left, with no power to cancel these
discounts in the future.
It was only after the 1967 Arab-Israeli war and

^PEC, Resolution IV. 33.

2

al-Otaiba, Op. Cit., p. 145.

^Alnasrawi, Op. Cit., p. 192.
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the fear of an energy shortage, that the oil companies
aware of their somewhat weakening position, accepted to
open negotiations on all allowances and discounts.

The

Tehran Agreement concluded on February 14, 1971 marked the
official end of all company discounts.
OPEC in the first decade of its existence was not
a very effective organization.

Determined to present it

self as an organization of moderation, it earned instead
a reputation of weakness.^ Consequently its various stands
and resolutions were not taken very seriously by the major
oil companies.

Furthermore, the strategy it adopted of

conducting individual country-company negotiations, undermined its effectiveness from the start.

2

Failing to pre

sent a united front by copying the example.of the oil
companies, OPEC hurt its own interests.
The ineffectiveness of OPEC in the sixties can also
be explained in the attitude of the oil companies toward
it.

From the beginning, the major oil companies treated

OPEC with indifference.

They at times even refused to

acknowledge its existence.

Robert Braun, President of

ARAMCO, refused to allow the name of OPEC to be mentioned
in the 1962 negotiations that were being conducted with
Saudi Arabia on the question of royalty payment.

When the

1Ibid., p. 191.
2Ibid., p. 189.
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Saudi Oil Minister, Sheikh Ahmad Zaki Yamani, pressured
him to have a meeting with an OPEC committee to discuss
this matter, Braun is quoted to have said, "We don't recog
nize the so called OPEC."'L
In general the oil companies tried over a period of
years to reduce the new organization into a technical
hody with no real power of its own.
Although the oil companies dealt collectively with
the oil governments, they refused to allow the same princi
ple to apply in their dealings with OPEC.

Choosing to ig

nore OPEC, they continued to deal individually with the oil
countries, pitting them against each other all the time.

2

Relations between the oil companies and the oil pro
ducing nations, members of OPEC, began to improve with the
events of the 196? Arab-Israeli war and the subsequent clo
sure of the Suez Canal.
on the oil scene.

These events changed the picture

First, there was the oil embargo that

the Arab oil nations declared against the West following
the outbreak of hostilities in the region.

Then there was

a tremendous rise in the oil transportation rates followed
by an increase in the price of petroleum and petroleum
products in the world market.

By the end of the sixties,

the demand for oil was increasing rapidly and there were

Bosley, Op. Cit., p. 321.
^Sampson, Op. Cit., p. 165.
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first signs of a shortage, world wide, in oil.

The inter

national oil market that had remained for so long a buyer's
market was slowly becoming a seller's market.'*'
Libya was the first oil country to bring about a
successful increase in petroleum prices.

According to one

observer, "It was Libya that transformed the oil industry."

2

Libya dealt with the oil companies outside the cautious
framework of OPEC.

Following the same strategy that the

companies used all along, Libya dealt with the companies (in
its 1970 negotiations) one by one.

Demanding an increase in

prices, it first reduced its production output and later
threatened to take unilateral action if its demands were
not met.
The oil companies operating in Libya gave in and
other companies had to follow suit in offering similar in
creases to the remaining oil nations.

By 1973* thirteen

years following the creation of OPEC, the major oil export
ing countries were able to, wrest from the international oil
companies the role of deciding the price of their natural
resource in the light of their joint interests as well as
the market forces.3

^"Sampson, On. Cit.. pp.215-216.

2

Christopher T. Rand, Making Democracy Safe for Oil
(Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 197f>)* p. 233.
-^Zuhayr Mikdashi, "The OPEC Process", Daedalus, Vol.
10^, No. k, (Fall 1975). P. 203.
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Early Attempts At Oil Diplomacy
The 1967 June war brought about the use of oil as
a diplomatic weapon in the attempt to achieve a solution
for the Arab-Israeli conflict.

This was not, however, the

first time that oil was used as a political lever by the
Arabs.

The principle of using oil in the Arab political

struggle can be traced back to 19^6, two years before the
establishment of the state of Israel, when the call was
first made to deny Arab oil to Western countries support
ing the Zionist movement in Palestine.
The Establishment of the State of Israel
The theme for the creation of a Jewish home was
develped by Theodor Herzl, an influential journalist in
Austria, in his book titled Per Judenstaat (The Jewish State)
written in 1895.

Herzl witnessed the persecution and dis

crimination against Jews in Europe, and he felt that the
only way to solve the Jewish problem would be in the crea
tion of a homeland for them.
Through the successful efforts of Herzl, the first
world Zionist Congress met in Basel, Switzerland in August,
1897.

The program formulated at the end of the Congress,

referred to as the Basel program, declared that "the aim of
Zionism is to create for the Jewish people a home in Pales
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tine secured by public l a w . A t

the onset of World War I ,

a very powerful world-wide Zionist movement based on Herzl's
vision had fully

e m e r g e d .^

The early attempts by Herzl to

obtain the support of the German Kaiser and the Turkish Sul
tan, for the Jewish homeland in Palestine, ended in

fa ilu r e .-^

Following the death of Herzl in 1904, the Zionists under the
new leadership of Dr, Chaim Weizmann, a chemistry professor
at Manchester and a prominent Jewish leader, turned to the
British for support.

By 1917» they were able to ally the

British government with the Zionist cause.

On November 2,

1917, a declaration of sympathy with Jewish Zionist aspira
tions was made public in the form of a letter from Lord
Balfour, the British Foreign Minister, to Lord Rothschild,
a prominent Jewish leader.

It stated the following:

Dear Lord Rothschild,
I have much pleasure in conveying to you,
on behalf of His Majesty's Government, the
following declaration of sympathy with
Jewish Zionist aspirations which has been
submitted to, and apporved by, the Cabinet.
His Majesty's Government view with favour
the establishment in Palestine of a nation
al home for the Jewish people, and will use
their best endeavours to facilitate the
achievement of this object, it being clear
ly understood that nothing shall be done

"^Don Peretz, The Middle East Today. 2nd edition
(Hinsdale, Illinois: Dryden Press, 1971)» P# 249,
2Ibid.. p, 250.
3

Henry Cattan, Palestine: The Road to Peace (London:
Longman Group Ltd,, 1971), p, 4.
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which may prejudice the civil and religious
rights of existing non-Jewish communities
in Palestine, or the rights and political
status enjoyed by Jews in any other country.
I should be grateful if you would bring
this declaration to the knowledge of the
Zionist Federation.
The British occupied Palestine during 1917-1918
placing it under their mandate.

This mandate was confirm

ed by the Council of the League of Nations in July 1922,
At the time of the mandate the number of the Jews living
in Palestine totalled about 8^,000 and the Palestinian
Arabs from both Moslem and the Christain faiths numbered
about 673,000,2
While the British government was promising the
Jews the establishment of a homeland for them in Palest
tine, it was giving its assurances to the Arab national
ists that Palestine as well as the neighboring Arab coun
tries would be granted their independence as soon as the
war was over.

Doors were open for Jewish immigration and

settlement in Palestine.

At the beginning, the number of

Jews immigrating was rather low, but after 1933, following
the takeover of the Nazi party in Germany and the policy
of genocide that Hitler used against the European Jews,

"Kj.C. Hurweitz, The Middle East and North Africa in
World Politics. A Documentary Record, Vol. II (New Haven:
Yale University Press, 1979), p, 106.
2
Quincy Wright, Middle East: Prospects for Peace.
Background Papers (Bebbs Ferry, N.Y.;Oceana, 1969), p,*k
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the numbers increased dramatically.

By 1946, the Jewish

population in Palestine grew from apporximately 10 percent
to about one third of the total population.
The Arab inhabitants were extremely alarmed by this
wave of Jewish immigration.

This led to unrest and to sev

eral riots by the Arab population,

in 1939» the British

government announced its intentions, in a White Paper, to
restrict Jewish immigration to 75»000 over the next five
years after which any further immigration would depend on
Arab acquiescence.

The White Paper also declared Britain's

intention to grant Palestine its independence within a de
cade.

The Jewish community opposed this new policy and

began a campaign of violence against the British mandate,
By the end of World War II, the situation was deteriorating
rapidly.

On April 2nd, 19^7, the British Mandatory govern

ment asked the United Nations to make recommendations con
cerning the future government of Palestine.

In August 19^7*

the majority of the United Nations Special Commission on
Palestine recommended the partition of Palestine and
creation of an Arab state, a Jewish state and an interna
tional trusteeship under the supervision of the U.N, for
the city of Jerusalem..
The Arabs were totally opposed to the partition
plan, while the Zionist Jews rallied their forces to secure

^eretz, Op. Cit., p, 269.
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a United Nations vote in its favor,

The Zionists also

stepped up their pressure on President Truman to support
partition.

They were successful in these efforts and the

U.S. put all its weight behind the partition plan,1

On

November 29, 19^7, the United Nations General Assembly
adopted a partition resolution by a vote of 33 "to 13 with
10 abstentions and one absentee.

In 19^7» "the Jews re

presented about one third of the total population, owning
around 7 percent of the land, but the adopted partition
plan gave them 56 percent of the Palestinian mandate.
The Arabs totally rejected the partition resolution and
considered it illegal on the basis that "the U.N. did
not possess any sovereignty, dominion or power over the
land of Palestine which would enable it to partition it
or otherwise break up the territorail integrity of the
country,"**

Furthermore, the resolution was rejected be

cause it denied the Palestinian Arabs majority their nat
ural right of self-determination.^

■^Cattan, Op. Cit., p, 16.
^United Nations, Official Records of the Second Ses
sion of the General Assembly: Plenary Meetings or ~cne Gene
ral Assembly. II. 19^7, 1^-24-1^25.
3

Thomas A, Bryson, American Diplomatic Relations with
the Middle East. 1784-1975T A Survey iMetuchen, N.J.; The
Scarecrow Press, Inc,, 1977)» p. 166.
attan, Op, Cit,, p, 17.
%bid.
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The whole Arab world rose in protest following the
adoption of the U.N. resolution.

Violence and demonstra

tions erupted all over Palestine.

Meanwhile the British

Mandatory Government was beginning to withdraw from the area,
The Palestinian Mandate was terminated by Britain on May 15,
19^8.
Israel.

On the same day, the Jews proclaimed the State of
Almost immediately it was recognized by the United

States government and a few days later by another big power,
the Soviet Union.

As a reaction to the Israeli declaration

the four neighboring Arab states*. Egypt, Transjordan, Syria
and Lebanon sent in armies totalling about 20,000 men to
assist the Palestinian Arabs. 1
war had begun.

The first Arab-Israeli

The war proved to be to the advantage of

the Israelis as the Arab armies were totally uncoordianted
and unprepared for fighting.

The Israeli army on the other

hand was totally modernized and thoroughly mobilized.

The

war ended in early 19^9 with Israel in control of "a third
more territory than the amount allocated to it by the U.N.
2
partition resolution." The remaining part of Palestine
passed under Jordanian rule (the Old City of Jerusalem and
the West Bank), and Egyptian rule (the Gaza Strip).

^ e e Edgar O'Ballance, The Arab-Israeli War. 19^8
(Londons Faber, 1956) for the detailed account of the first
Arab-Israeli War.
2
Peretz, Op. Cit., p, 2?6.
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One of the tragic consequences of the events of
19^8 was the displacement of 750.000 Palestinian Arabs, from
their homes.

They fled in panic to neighboring Arab coun

tries where the majority of them have been living in refu
gee camps up to this date.
The first attempts to politicize Arab oil can be
traced back to the events leading to the creation of the
State of Israel.The Arab

League,1 aware of the Western sup

port for the Zionist cause and anticipating the outbreak of
hostilities in Palestine, passed a resolution in its meeting
in Bludan, Syria, in June 19^6 which called on the.Arab oil
countries to deny their oil to the West,2

However, when

the first Arab-Israeli war broke out in May 19^8, following
the establishment of the State of Israel, the Arab League's
decision was not

putinto effect. The only country that

followed through

wasIraq.

George Lenczowski explains the

reason for not implementing the resolution was Saudi opposi
tion.

The leaders of Saudi Arabia believed "that a commer

cial oil operation should be divorced from political con
siderations,"-^

This position can be explained by the fact

that the revenues that Saudi Arabia was getting from the

^ h e Arab. League pact was signed on March 22, 19^5
and was composed then of Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, Iransjordan
(later known as Jordan), Saudi Arabia and Egypt.
2
George Lenczowski, Oil and State in the Middle East
(Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, i960), p. 188.
3Ibid.
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oil companies were very small and they represented its ma
jor if not only source of income at that time.
Nevertheless, this early attempt at Arab oil diplo
macy was somewhat successful as Lenczowski explains:
...the interests of the oil companies were
affected,,.in three ways: a) in an outburst
of resentment against the American policy
(support for the establishment of Israel),
Syria delayed ratification of the Tapline
convention about twenty months; b) in a
gesture of defiance toward Israel and out
of solidarity with other Arab states, Iraq
stopped the movement of oil by pipeline to
the Israeli-held Haifa terminal and caused
construction of the parallel line between
Kirkuk and Haifa to cease; and c) boycott
measures against Israel by the Arab League
gradually affected the transactions of a
number of oil companies with Israel.1
As a result of the boycott measures, Israel was
compelled to build its own refineries and to get its oil
p
from non-Arab countries like Iran and Venezuela,
The
closing of the pipeline by Iraq did not, however, affect
Western countries seriously.

Western Europe was still

very dependent on coal for its energy; oil ranked insig
nificantly on its energy list.
In the fifties, the picture changed to a great ex
tent.

Western Europe was rapidly expanding its industries

and oil was becoming more and more one of its major sources

1Ibid,

2

Manahoran, Op. Cit., p. 83.
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of energy.

Japan had also entered the picture as a major

consumer of Arab oil.

When the second Arab-Israeli war

"broke out, following the nationalization of the Suez Canal,
a second oil crisis "began for Western Europe.
The 1956 Suez Crisis
The Suez Crisis of 1956 "began with the nationaliza
tion of the Suez Canal "by Gamal Abdul Nasser, the President
of Egypt.

Nasser had wanted to build the Aswan Dam, a pro

ject that was going to symbolize Egypt's new independence.
It was also a project that was greatly popular for it was
going to improve irrigation on the Nile Valley and also de
velop hydro-electricity as well as control floods.

The

governments of the United States and Britain had offered
to finance the building of the dam partially.

The bulk of

the money for the project was to come from the World Bank;
however, its offer was contingent on the British and the
American contributions.

Then the American offer,, in retal

iation of Nasser's recognition of China, was withdrawn abrupt
ly, leading to an automatic cancellation of the World Bank
commitment.
Nasser decided to nationalize the Suez Canal after
this sudden change of events.

Up to that point the Canal

was run by an international company, the main interests
of which were in British and French hands.

By restoring
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the Suez Canal to the Egyptian people, Nasser planned to
use the revenues to help finance the Dam.
this decision was announced by Nasser.

On July 26, 1956,

And all hell broke

loose.
To the Western European countries, nationalization
of the Canal seemed to pose an immediate threat.

Their

economies were becoming at that point very dependent on
Middle Eastern oil.
Western

Much of the

oil that the economiesof

Europe needed was coming from the Middle Eastand

the Far East, through the Canal; a sizeable amount came
from the Middle Eastern pipelines.

Both these avenues met

approximately two thirds of Western Europe's petroleum re
quirements.^"
Anthony Eden, the then British Prime Minister, des
cribes the energy considerations following the nationaliza
tion of the Canal:
We estimated that the United Kingdom had
reserves of oil which would last for six
weeks, and that the other countries of
Western Europe owned comparatively smaller
stocks. The continuing supply of fuel,
which was a vital source of power to the
economy of Britain, was now subject to
Colonel Nasser’s whim. The oilfields of
the Middle East were then producing about
1^5 million tons a year. Nearly ?0 million
tons of oil passed through the Suez Canal
in 1955» almost all of it destined for
Western Europe. Another ^0 million tons

"^Harold Lubell, Middle East Oil Crisis and Western
Europe Energy Supplies (Baltimore, Maryland: John Hopkins
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of oil reached the ports of the Levant by
pipelines running through the territories
of Egypt's then allies, Syria and Saudi
Arabia.1
Eden and his colleagues, especailly the French, fear
ed that the nationalist fervor that Nasser seemed to stir
in the Arab masses would spread to the Arab oil producing
countries.

If that happened, they beleived, that the supply

of Middle Eastern oil as well as Western influence in gener
al would be in total jeopardy.

President Nasser in his own

book, The Philosophy of the Revolution, first published in
195^» had been calling to the attention of his Arab brothers
the vitality of oil or what he termed "this element of
strength" that the Arabs possessed.

He wrote:

Oil- a sinew of material civilization with
out which all its machines would cease to
function. The great factories, producing
every kind of goods, all the instruments
of land, sea and air communications; all
the weapons of war,..- without oil, all
would turn back to naked metal, covered
with rust, incapable of motion or use.2
The British feared Nasser's popularity and wanted
him out,

Eden believed that now that the Canal is in

Egyptian hands, they "might decide to interfere with its
passage.

They might also prompt their allies to cut the

Anthony Eden, Full Circle: The Memoirs of Anthony
Eden (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., I960), p. 4?8.
2
Gamal Abdul Nasser, Egypt's Liberation: The Philo
sophy of the Revolution (Washington, D.C.: Public Affairs
Press, 1955), pp. 106-107.
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pipelines. We had to gauge the implications of bringing oil
from the Persian Gulf by the long haul around the Cape of
Good Hope."1

If Britain, according to Eden, were to have a

future role in the Middle East region, Nasser had to be
ousted,2

The decision was made by Britain in collabora

tion with France to invade Egypt.

Israel decided to join

in this venture, for it too felt threatened by Nasser and
by his advocation of Arab nationalism.
The plan called for an Israeli invasion of Egyptian
territories as a convenient pretext for the stepping in
of the British and the French.^

The plan went as agreed.

On October 29, 1956, Israel invaded Egyptian territories
occupying the greater part of the Sinai Peninsula and also
the Gaza Strip.

Twenty four hours later, Britain and France

sent an ultimatum to the belligerents stating that if hosti
lities do not stop, they would have to step in to separate
the two sides and protect the Suez Canal,

On October 31 *

the Egyptians sank a number of vessels in the Canal,

The

drama on the oil scene had just begun.
The reaction of the Arab countries to the invasion
of Egyptian territories ranged from total solidarity to

^den, Op. Cit., p.
2P, Edward Haley, "Britain and the Middle East,"
in Tareq Y. Ismael, The Middle East in World Politics
(Syracuse, New York: Syracuse University Press, 197^).
pp. ^9-^9.
-^Ibid., p, 50.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

bo
to cool-headedness.

Oil, vital for the two Western Euro

pean invaders and the most obvious target, immediately
came into the picture.

It was to be used for the second

time as an instrument of diplomacy.

Britain had the pre

dominant influence in the Iraqi Petroleum Company, con
trolling over half of its shares.'*'

The French also had

substantial holdings in this Company.

Pipelines for the

Iraqi Petroleum Company (IPC) extended from Iraq to Syria
and Lebanon, to their final destinations on the Mediter
ranean Sea.
The Iraqi government, an ally of Britain and one
of the star members of the Baghdad Pact, dit not want to
jeopardize its relations with Britain and the West.

How

ever, in order to quieten its masses who were asking for
reprisals against Britain, it announced its refusal to
attend the Baghdad Pact meetings until Britain withdrew
from Egyptian territory,

Syria, on the other hand, reacted

with extreme sympathy to the Egyptian plight.

Even though

it was not an oil producing country, Syria was quite vital
on the oil scene since the pipelines went throught its
territories.

Three days following the invasion, the three

IPC pumping stations on Syrian land were blown up.

As a

result, the flow of Iraqi oil to the Mediterranean ports
2
of Banias and Tripoli was halted.

■^Lenczowski, Op. Cit,, p, 322,
2Ibid,, p, 325.
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Saudi Arabian oil was not yet very vital for the
British and the French invaders in 1956.

Nonetheless,

Saudi Arabia, showing its solidarity with Egypt,"proclaimed
an embargo on the shipment of Saudi oil and oil products to
Britain and France and a ban on the fueling of British and
French ships and all ships carrying, oil to these two•coun
tries."3' The United States was not a target of this first
Saudi oil embargo, as the American government was playing
an even-handed policy in this crisis.

The ban of Saudi oil

continued until the Israeli forces withdrew from Egyptian
territories and from the Gaza Strip in March of 1957.
In another major Arab oil producing country, Kuwait,
the government's reaction was rather mild.

However, the

nationalist elements in the country tried, weeks after the
invasion took place, to sabotage oil installations.

But

the damage was slight and the Kuwaiti oil production was
not seriously affected.
The shortage of the oil supplies during the 1956
oil crisis resulted from the blowing up .of the IPC stations
2
in Syria which reduced the Iraqi output by 73 percent. It
was also due to the blocking of the Suez Canal and the
Saudi embargo against Britain and France.

These events

could have had disastrous effects on the European economies,

1Ibid., p. 335.
2Lubell, Op. Cit.. p. 10.
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had it not been for the U.S. government.

Shoshana Klebanoff

described the American efforts during the crisis:
...the United States assumed full respon
sibilities for Europe's survival by struc
turing one of the most extraordinary world
wide organizations in all contemporary his
tory. This effort, popularly known as the
"Emergency Oil Lift to Europe," was perhaps
second only to the Marshall plan in the
grandiose scale of its., design and the magni
tude of its operation.
Domestic oil production was increased dramatically to meet
European demands.

Approximately 150,000 to 200,000 barrels

per day of this new stepped up production were sent to Eu
rope,2

Furthermore, the United States recruited petroleum

and petroleum products from various oil producing countries
in the world for Western Europe's benefit.

Tankers were

also recruited to carry petroleum around the Cape of Good
Hope.

All these efforts were very successful in withering

away the oil crisis of 1956.

Thus the Arab oil embargo

which went on for about six months did not have any serious
impact on Western Europe.
The unity that the Western world showed during this
oil crisis as evidenced by the radical increase in oil
shipment from the Western hemisphere to Western Europe and
by complete co-operation between the oil companies and the

^"Shoshana Klebanoff, Middle East Oil and U.S. Foreign Policy (New York: Praeger, 19?4), p, 128.
2Ibid.. p. 130.
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governmental agencies to increase oil supplies was con
trasted by division and lack of co-operation in the Arab
world.'1' Each Arab nation reacted to the crisis individual
ly.

There was no planning, unity or co-ordination among

the various splits in its camps.
on the best terms.

Iraq and Syria were not

Iraq was further suspicious of Nasser

and his nationalistic ideas.

Another reason for Arab dis

unity was the fear of Western retaliation if the supplies
of oil were threatened over an extended perios of time.
The fact that the oil companies were in complete control
over the production of oil in the whole Middle Eastern
region was another undermining factor for any Arab cohesion in this second attempt of oil diplomacy.

2

The 1967 Arab-Israeli War
On June 4, 1967, Israel invaded Egypt and the third
round of the Arab-Israeli war unfolded.

The foreign min

isters of the Arab oil-producing and transporting Coun
tries met in Baghdad to discuss the strategy to be follow
ed in this crisis,

Nasser had announced to the world that

Britain and the United States had joined the Israelis in
their attack against the Arabs (Jordan and Syria were also

■^Farouk A. Sankari "The Character and Impact of Arab
Oil E m b a r g o e s i n Arab Oil: Impact on the Arab Countries and
the Global Implications, eds.. Naiem A. gherbiny and Mark
A. Tesslter (New York: Praeger, 1976), p, 267.
2Ibid.
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drawn into the war).

These were false accusations based

on erroneous reports that Nasser had received. This belief
though seemed to unify the Arabs into a plan to boycott
their oil to the West.

The decision was reached to "Stop

the flow of oil to world markets, and to prevent Arab oil
from reaching, directly or indirectly, any country which
supported or was obligated to support Israel."1 Following
the Iraqi lead, Kuwait, Libya, Algeria, Saudi Arabia and
Bahrain announced their oil embargo against Britain and
the United States.

This was the first time that Arab oil

was denied to the U.S.

West Germany was later included as

it was selling gas masks to Israel during that time.
The subsequent closure of the Suez Canal, this time
indefinitely, created another crisis in transportation.
What used to be a four day trip for oil to and from Europe
became a seventy day trip; oil coming from the Persian Gulf
had to be re-routed along the Cape of Good Hope.
as a result skyrocketed.

The costs

Before the June war, the trans

portation rate was 2.75 $ per ‘ton of oil carried.

At the

height of the crisis it cost 18.00 $ per ton for the long
trip around the Cape of Good Hope.^

■^Benjamin Shwadran, "The Growth and Power of the
Middle East Oil Producing Countries," in From June to
October: The Middle East between 19o7 and 1973. eds. Itamar
Rabinovich and Haim Shaked (New Brunswick, N.J.: Trans
action Books, 1978), P* 14-6.

2

U.S. News and World Report. July 3» 1967.
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At the time of the outbreak of hostilities in 1967*
Western Europe's need for Arab oil had increased tremen
dously as it had almost totally by then replaced the use
of coal as a primary source of energy.

It looked in the

beginning that a major crisis was in the making, but as
days went by it became apparent that there was no need for
any emergency measures at all.

The 1967 oil crisis made

only "a slight ripple" in comparison with that of 1956.
This can be explained in the fact the Europeans learned a
lesson from the shortages during the 1956 crisis.

It had

served for them as "warning that the disruption of oil sup
plies from the Middle East at some future date, perhaps
over a longer period, could not be ruled out."-*-

To reduce

their vulnerability a number of measures were taken.

These

included the stockpiling of large reserves, establishing
an alternate source of energy (nuclear power) and the de
velopment of alternative routes for petroleum transporta
tion.2

By the time that the Suez Canal was closed in 1967

the petroleum industry had lost its major interest in
this route.3

^Walter Laqueur, Struggle for the Middle East: The
Soviet Union in the Mediterranean. 1958-1968 (London:Routledge and Kegan, 1969), p, 126.
2Ibid.
%lebanoff, On. Cit., p, 217.
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The Arab oil nations discovered a few days after
the initiation of their oil boycott, that it was not work
ing.

In addition to the measures that the Europeans had

undertaken to counter this crisis, two major oil producers
Iran and Venezuela, both non Arab countries, were benefit
ing from the shortages on the world market.

Even though

these two countries were members of OPEC, they had no in
tention of joining in the boycott.

Instead they stepped

up their production at a tremendous rate.'*'

The Arab oil

states discovered further that they did not have the finan
cial reserves to continue the boycott without oil revenues,
According to Leonard Mosley: "Saudi Arabia was the first
to feel the pinch acutely.... King Faisal was informed by
his finance minister that there was no more money in the
till...."2

and that something had to be done to salvage

the situation.
Instead of being used as an instrument of pressure
against Western countries, the Arab oil policies in June
1967t caused more damages to the Arab nations in the form
of heavy financial losses.

According to Sheikh Ahmad Zaki

Yamani, the Saudi Oil Minister," the embargo, "hurt the Arabs
themselves more than anyone else, and the only ones to gain

^Mosley.

Op .

Cit.. p. 3^5.

2Ibid.. p. 3M.
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any benefit from it were the non-Arab producers."1

For the

United States, Britain and West Germany, the embargo was
more of an inconvenience than one that caused serious or
lasting damages.

The U.S. was almost still self sufficient

in oil; its total import of Arab oil did not exceed 3 per
cent of its energy consumption.2

The European nations suf

fered mostly from the increase in the shipping costs of
oil along the route of the Cape of Good Hope.
The question of lifting the oil embargo was discuss
ed in the Arabs Heads of State Summit Conference held in
Khartoum in August 1967.

Only Iraq and to some ex-ent,

Algeria, were pressing still for measures against the West.
The Iraqis were insisting on a complete shutdown in oil
production until Israel withdraws from the newly occupied
Arab territories.

Israel, as a result of the June 1967 war

had occupied the Egyptian Sinai Peninsula, the Gaza Strip,
the West Bank and the Old City of Jerusalem which

was

under Jordanian rule since 19^9* as well as the Syrian
Golan Heights.

The rest of the Arab nations at the Khar

toum Conference, realizing that the boycott had been an
economic disaster for them, reached a decision to end the
embargo.

Thus, "Resolution No, 4 declared that pumping oil

is an assertion of positive Arab energy, which can be used

^-Middle East Economic Survey, June 7, 1968.
2

Klebanoff, Op. Cit., p, 219.
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to serve Arab objectives and that it should be resumed.
The embargo was formally lifted under the new slo
gan of using oil "positively" as a political weapon.

The

Arab oil nations agreed that it had been handled very poor
ly in the 196? war.

Sheikh Yamani talked about the impor

tance of this weapon and the need to use it carefully for
"if we do not use it properly, we are behaving like some
one who fires a bullet into the air, missing the enemy and
2
allowing it to rebound on himself."
The three major oil
producers: Libya, Saudi Arabia and Kuwait, agreed at the
end of the Khartum

summit to pay an annual sum of 378

million dollars to cover the war losses suffered by Jordan
Egypt and Syria.
Thus this new round of oil diplomacy against the
Western countries who were supporters of Israel ended also
in failure.

Fuad Itayim, a noted Arab expert on oil, ana

lyzes the reasons for this failure:
1. The U,S., the prime target of the
oil weapon was immune to the Arab
•bargo because it was at that time
tally self-sufficient in terms of
ern Hemisphere oil supplies.

Arab
emto
West

2. The international oil companies did an
outstanding job of making up the short
fall in Arab oil supplies to the em
bargoed countries from other sources

^Oil and Gas Journal, September 11, 196?.

2

Sheikh Rustum Ali, Saudi Arabia and Oil Diplomacy
(New York: Praeger, 1976), p, 106.
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^9
despite the closure of the Suez Canal.
3. No quota ceilings were imposed on pro
duction, with the result that no actual
physical shortage of oil was created.
There was no uniform interpretation of
the coverage of the embargo. Some of
the North African oil countries did not
in fact withhold supplies from West
Germany.
One outcome of the June 19&7 oil crisis was the es
tablishment of OAPEC, the Organization of the Arab Petro
leum Exporting Countries.

In a meeting that took place

in Beirut in January 1968, the three conservative Arab oil
producers: Saudi Arabia, Libya and Kuwait decided that it
was in their interest to form an Arab oil organization that
could be used to influence the political behavior of the
Western importing countries under the slogan "Oil as a
Positive Weapon."

Thus OAPEC was created; its Secretar

iat was set up in Kuwait.
This newly founded organization was not to conflict
in any of its decisions or actions with OPEC policies, the .
founders stressed.
two.

There should be no rivarly between the

Among OAPEC objectives also were the co-ordination

of petroleum planning for its members and the promotion of
joint economic projects.
The conservative nature of OAPEC did not last long.

■^Fuad Itayim, "Arab Oil-The Political Dimension",
Journal of Palestine Studies (Winter. 197*0» p. 85.
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With Qaddafi's coup in Libya, in September 1969. revolu
tionary tides began to sweep OAPEC.

By 19?0, the doors

were flung open for other revolutionary oil producing coun
tries to join.

Membership was expanded to include both oil

producing and non-oil producing Arab countries.

Today it

includes, in addition to the founder members: Iraq, Egypt,
Syria, Qatar, Dubai, Bahrain, Abu Dhabi and Algeria.

In

the 1973 October events was the vehicle behind the planning
and implementation of the fourth Arab oil embargo.
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We do not want to do anything that will hurt
America. But if our new special relationship is to're
main viable, the U.S. must not do anything that will hurt
us and the Arab world.
King. Faisal ..
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CHAPTER III

THE OIL WEAPON AND THE
OCTOBER WAR
The fourth Arab-Israeli war of October 1973 marked a
new era with the use of Arab oil as a diplomatic weapon. In
the three instances when it was used before, in 19^8, in
1956 and in 1967» Arab actions did not achieve notable re
sults in influencing the West to change its pro-Israeli po
licies.

In contrast to the previous instances, the 1973

embargo was launched on a massive scale, was well co-ordi
nated, decisive, with unified planning and purpose. Further,
it was greatly successful in bringing international atten
tion to focus on the issue of the Arab land occupied by
Israel since 1967 and the question of the Palestinians.
The motivation behind the use of oil as a diplomatic
weapon in the 1973 October war was a very simple one.

It

was intended "to draw the attention of the world to the
Arab cause in order to create the suitable political cli
mate for the implementation of Security Council Resolution
2^2

,,;L
Since 1967* Israel had occupied territory belonging

to Syria and Egypt and had displaced Jordan on the terri-

^New York Times, March 19t 197^*
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tories held by it under the armistice line of 19^9-

Israel

was not willing to give up her control over the Syrian Go
lan Heights, the Old Arab City of Jerusalem, the Gaza Strip
and the West Bank of the Jordan and the Egyptian Sinai Pen
insula, all seized during the June 1967 war.

In fact she

seemed to be tightening her grip over them.1

Moreover, Is

rael continued to disregard the issue of the Palestinians.
The world community seemed to be quite reluctant to apply
pressure on the State of Israel for the implementation of
the United Nations Security Council 2k2, passed on November
22, 1967, which stressed the inadmissibility of the acquistion of territory by war and called for the withdrawal of
Israeli forces from Arab land occupied in the 1967 war as
well as a just settlement of the Palestinian problem.

The

resolution also called for the respect and acknowledgement
of the sovereignty and political independence of every
state in the area and their rights to live in peace and
security.

Arabs felt that their rights were being violat

ed time and again since the establishment of the State of
Israel in Palestine in 19^8 , while the industralized world
looked the other way.

In fact, many of the Western coun

tries in general and the United States in particular, were

Bryson, Op. Cit.. P, 258.
2United Nations. Resolution 2*1-2.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

5^
lending Israel a helping hand.

While the Arabs received

arms and weapons from the Soviet Union and the East Camp,
the level of the sophisticated military aid and equipment
given to Israel by Western powers was superior.

To the

Arabs, such assistance was encouraging Israel in its in
transigent attitudes and policies regarding the territo
ries and the Palestinian issues.
The Arabs had a devastating defeat in the 196? June
war.

Since then they turned in desperation to King Faisal

of Saudi Arabia for help in the hope of using Arab oil as
a political lever for the achievement of a just solution
for the Arab-Israeli problem.

Saudi Arabia possessed the

largest reserves of oil in the world and the industralized
Western world including the United States, were becoming
increasingly dependent on her for their oil supplies.

The

Arabs wanted King Faisal to use this unique weapon against
the United States which has beer for a long time the only
power with leverage on Israel,

By applying pressure on

the U.S.,-it was hoped the Americans would force Israel in
to giving up Arab land and into finding a just solution for
the Palestinian people.
The Muslim world was also turning towards King Fai
sal for the liberation of the Arab City of Jerusalem cap
tured by Israel during the 19^7 war.

For the 6,000.000

Muslims of the World, Jerusalem is considered the third
holiest city in Islam after Mecca and Medina. In the early
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years of the Prophet Muhammad's teaching, the direction of
prayer in Islam (known as the Qiblah), was set towards Jeru
It was changed towards Mecca in 6?.k A.D.1

salem.

In the

Islamic tradition it is believed that Muhammad ascended to
Heaven from Jerusalem at the time of his "nocturnal jour
ney" .

First the Angel Gabriel carried him from Mecca to

Jerusalem where he prayed at the "Farthest Mosque", Known
as the al-Aqsa Mosque.

A shrine was built, in the last

part of the Seventh Century by an Islamic Caliph, over the
rock on which he stood before he was lifted by God to Heav2
en.
This shrine is known today as the Mosque of Omar and
also referred to as the Dome of the Rock because of its
golden domed shape.

In the Islamic tradition, Muhammad's

journey to Heaven, known as "al-Israa wa al-Mi'raj" is,of
particular importance for in addition to its being a mira
cle, it established one of the main principles of Islam:
the obligation of every Muslim for prayers five times eve3

ry day.

Following his journey and his conversation with

God, Muhammad, according to the tradition, returned to Mec
ca.

The ascent of Muhammad to Heaven from Jerusalem is

■^Richard H, Pfaff, "Jerusalem: Keystone of an ArabIsraeli Settlement" in The Arab-Israeli Conflict, ed, John
Norton Moore (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1977)»
p, 2^5.
2Ibid.
^Ibid., p, 2^6.
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stated in the Koran.

It reads:

In the name of God, Most Gracious, Most
Merciful.
Glory to (God)
Who did take His Servant
For a Journey by night1
From the Sacred Mosque
To the Farthest Mosque
Whose precincts We did
Bless-in order that We
Might show him some
Of Our Signs: for He
Is the One Who heareth 2
And seeth (all things).
The resolution for the partition of Palestine pass
ed on November 29, 19^7* called for the creation of a Jew
ish State and an Arab State.

As for the City of Jerusalem

it recommended the following:
The City of Jerusalem shall be established
as corpus separatum under a special inter
national regime and shall be administered .
by the United Nations. The Trusteeship Coun
cil shall be designated to discharge the
responsibilities of the Administering Au*
thority on behalf of the United Nations.J
However, within a few days following the passing of the
partition plan violence erupted in the City of Jerusalem,
between the Palestinian Arabs and the Jewish community.
This fighting over the control of the city continued un
til the first Arab-Israeli war, which took place several

"^Refers to the Ka'aba in Mecca.
2Surrah XVII, Ayah 1.
•^United Nations General Assembly.Resolution 181.
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months later, came to an end.

When the cease-fire line was

proclaimed in 19^9» Jerusalem had been partitioned along
the same lines of the communal division of the city,1

The

Jewish community had captured the western sector of Jeru
salem, while the rest, incorporating the Old City and the
Islamic Holy Places, remained in the hands of the Palestin
ian Arabs.

This de facto partition lasted for 19 years

when in 196? Israel captured forcefully the Arab sector of
Jerusalem.

Since 1967 Israel has "continued to implement

its political, legal, economic and deomgraphic plans to
integrate this part of occupied Jordan with the State of
2
Israel."
Following the Israeli capture of East Jerusalem,
they began a large scale expropriation campaign of Arab
land.-^

Since then they have established Jewish settlements

and erected high rise buildings in the Old City.

The U.N.

has passed several resolutions asking the Israeli govern
ment to stop its actions towards changing the status of
the city^ however, Israel has not abided by them.
The issue of Arab Jerusalem is of extreme importance
to the Arabs and to the Muslims all over the world.

1Pfaff, Op. Cit.. p, 262.
2Ibid., p.. 237.
3
New York Times, August 30, 1980.
4
See Resolutions 2253 and 225^.
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Even

its name in Arabic "al-Quds" refle.cts this special, attach
ment. It translates into"the Sanctuary” or "the Holy". The
Arabs insist on the return of the Old City of Jerusalem to
them.

Arab leaders have often called for a holy war in de

fense of the city.

King Faisal spoke on numerous occasions

as leader of the annual pilgrimage to Mecca and as protec
tor of the Islamic holy places, asking Muslims to "rise to
help their religion and defend the holy places" of the City
of Jerusalem.1

The Saudi king reiterated often his wish

to pray at the al-Aqsa Mosque before he dies.
Saudi Arabia was becoming increasingly aware of the
formidable economic power it held in its hands.

Having a-

bout 22 percent or 150 billion barrels of the world's known
oil reserves,2

that kind of power translated easily into

political power, specially with the world demand for pet
roleum continuing to climb sharply.

Its surplus financial

reserves were also climbing steadily, a factor that was ab
sent up to the end of the sixties.
Meanwhile, King Faisal's disenchantment with the
United States was continuing to grow.

He had been receiv

ing reassurances from the American government for a more
even handed policy toward^ the Arabs. However, it was be-

^ e w York Times. March 7» 1968.

2

The Washington Post. April 19» 1973*

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

59

coming apparent that the U.S. was not intending to reconsi
der its special relationship with Israel.

Faisal even went

to the measure of applying pressure on President Sadat of
Egypt to dissociate himself from the Russians in the hope
that such a move would "bring shout American efforts for a
solution of

the Arab-Israeli conflict.

done,according to an article

This move was even

in the New York Times Magazine.

upon the suggestion of the U.Ss
In the spring of 1972 Washington suggested
to Faisal that if he would help persuade
President Anwar Sadat to reduce
the Russian
presence in Egypt, America would press Is
rael to withdraw from conquered Arab terri
tory. Faisal exhorted Sadat accordingly,
for this and other reasons Sadat expelled
the Russians in July of that year.-!However, "Nixon ignored this epochal event." And "Faisal
2
felt betrayed."
By 1973» King Faisal was becoming more
convinced that the U.S. stand was not about to change un
less some kind of pressure was applied on it.

The only

weapon in the Arabs meager arsenal was their petroleum.
Faisal was coming to the conclusion that indeed oil and
politics do mix and perhaps very well for that matter.
The oil embargo that was enforced following the out
break of the October 1973 Arab-Israeli war, should not have
come as a surprise to the West for there were many earlier
signs.

The U.S. only chose to ignore them.

On at least

■^Edward Sheehan, "Unradical Sheiks who shake the
World."New York Times Magazine, March 2k, 197^» P* 52.
2Ibid.
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6o
three occasions between April and October of 1973# King Fai
sal revealed his intentions to the United Statess The U.S.
must pressure Israel or else the oil weapon would be used.
In April 1973» Faisal sent his Oil Minister Sheikh
Yamani and his son Prince Saud al-Faisal, to Washington where
they met with top officials at the State Department and the
Treasurey Department.

The message they carried that it was

impossible for the Saudi government to ignore the interests
of its Arab neighbors, and that it would not expand its oil
production (which the U.S. had been asking for) unless Wash
ington created the "right political atmosphere" in the areal
This meant that the U.S. must change its pro-Israeli stance
in this conflict.

Following an interview with Yamani, the

Washington Post wrote an article titled: "Saudis Tie Oil
to U.S. Policy on Israel."

It noted:

The Saudis are known to feel under increas
ing pressure from the radical Arab states
and the Palestinian guerrillas to use their
oil as a political weapon for pressuring
Washington into forcing Israel into a com
promise settlement with the Arabs.
These meetings did not bring about any results whatsoever.
Yamani later told friends: "It was a dialogue of the deaf."^
The second time that Faisal linked oil and politics
1
The Washington Post, 19 April, 1973.
2Ibid.
3
Sheehan, Op. Cit., p . 5 2
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was in May 1973 when he told the officials at the American
Arab Company (ARAMCO) that "time is running out" and that
the Americans "will lose everything" if there is no change
in their stand in the Middle East conflict.

Further, he

emphasized to the oil executives that "he is not able to
stand alone much longer", as a friend of the U.S. in the
Middle East.

"It would be more and more difficult to hold

off the tide of opinion that was now running so heavily against America", the King stressed, and "it was up to those
Americans and American enterprises who were friends of the
Arabs and who had interests in the area to urgently do
something to change the posture of the U.S. Government!'.1
Washington was informed of the King's remarks imme
diately.

Aware of the seriousness of the situation, the

oil officials

asked for a change in the American policy.

Their cable emphasized that "Action must be taken urgently,
otherwise everything will be lost".

2

The response of the

U.S. government to the urgent cable of the oil executives
stated:
,,,H.M.(King Faisal) is calling wolf when
no wolf exists except in his imagination.
Also there is little or nothing that the
U.S. Government can do or will do on an
urgent-basis to affect the Arab-Israeli
issue.-5

Ch u r c h Committee Hearings, part 7% pp. 50^-507.
2Ibid.. p, 509.
3I M d .
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King Faisal reiterated his position for the third
time in an interview with Newsweek Magazine on September
10, 1973.

In this interview, Faisal stated that it was the

United States flow of aid and weapons to Israel that fur
thers its intransigent position on occupied Arab land and
the Palestinian issue.

It is therefore the duty of the

American government to rectify the situation.

"If no Ameri

can response is forthcoming," King Faisal declared, "we
shall view the matter exclusively from the view point of our
self interest",1
The United States wanted a significant increase in
Saudi oil production from the level of 7.2 million barrels
2
a day in 1973 to 20 millions a day by 1980.
Saudi Arabia
was willing to comply, provided the U.S. created "the right
political atmosphere", which meant settling the Arab-Israeli conflict including the Palestinian issue in a "just,
3
equitable way".
Faisal's messages as well as as those of
his emissary, Sheikh Yamani, clearly indicated that the
Saudis would lower their production level if their demands
were not met.

Already saturated with oil revenues, the

Saudis could well afford to keep their oil in the ground

Newsweek, September 10, 1973.

2

The Washington Post, April 19. 1973*

3

Itayim, Op. Cit., p, 89.
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where its value could only increase.'1' The messages fur
ther implied that if the situation was allowed to go on
much longer, Arab oil could be denied to those countries
2
supporting Israel altogether.
A few figures on the American scene showed that they
heard the Saudis.

One such figure was Senator William

Fullbright who said while being interviewed on the T.V.
program "Face The Nation" that the U.S. should play a more
3
even-handed role in the Middle East conflict.
Otto Miller
the chairman of the oil company Socal, was also very con
cerned.

In a letter to stockholders, he stated, "There is

now a growing feeling in much of the Arab world that the
United States has turned its back on the Arab people".
However, these were only a few scattered hardly heard voices.
The State Department did not take the Saudi threat
seriously.

Among the American offipials, the common res

ponse was, "they need us as much as we need them", or"they
can't drink the oil", or "Boycotts never work".3

Later,

1rbid.
2Ibid
3Christopher T. Rand, Making Democracy Safe for Oil
(Boston: Little, Brown and Co,, 1975)» P» 325.
Ibid.
^James E. Akins, "The Oil Crisis: This Time the Wolf
is Here", Foreign Policy. Vol. $1, No, 3» (April 1973)*
p. ^67.
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President Nixon warned that "the Arabs risked losing their.
oil market if they tried to act too tough".1
Although Saudi Arabia acted as a pacesetter in the
1973 embargo, the pre-October war position of the other
Arab nations regarding oil diplomacy,did not differ from
the Saudis.

In fact, some were even more radical.

On May

15» 1973» the 25th anniversary of the establishment of the
State of Israel, Algeria, Iraq and Kuwait stopped the flow
of their oil production for one hour.

Libya stopped it for

twenty four hours.
In a meeting held in Kuwait on September k, 1973*
the Foreign Ministers of the OAPEC nations discussed in gen
eral the use of Arab oil in the service of the Arab cause.
Some of the positions stated were quite extreme: "Iraq, Al
geria, and to a certain extent Libya took the position that
nationalization or partial nationalization of foreign assets
was the best economic/political antidote to continuing U.S.
2
support of Israel",
The position of Saudi Arabia had al
ready been known.

It was ready to dissociate itself from

the ties it had with the U.S. if the latter failed to cre
ate a political climate aimed at settling the Arab-Israeli
conflict.
Hostilities erupted between Syria, Egypt and Israel

1Time, January 6, 1975.
2
Itayim, Op. Cit.. p, 89.
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on October 6, 1973*

Less than twenty four hours after the

war began, Iraq announced the nationalization of American
interests shared by Exxon and Mobil in the Basrah Petroleum
Company calling its action a blow to "those who support Is
rael".1

It also called on other Arab oil-producing coun

tries to nationalize American oil interests in the region
in support of the Arab cause.
On October 9» Kuwait called for an emergency meeting
of all the Oil Ministers, members of OAPEC, in order to
discuss "what role oil might be able to play in the ArabIsraeli war."

2

A conference was convened on October 17*

1973 in Kuwait and was attended by eleven Arab countries:
Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Iraq, Libya, Algeria, Kuwait, Dubai,
Abu Dhabi, Syria, Qatar and Bahrain.

They decided "to make

the United States aware of the exorbitant price the great
industrial states are paying as a result of the blind and
3
limitless support for Israel."
The Communique passed at
the end of the meeting stated that it was unanimously, agreed
to reduce oil production by not less than 5 percent of the
September (1973) level, plus a 5 percent reduction per month
until Arab occupied land was liberated and'the problem of
the Palestinian people was resolved,

1Qil and Gas Journal. October 15* 1973.
2Ibid.
3

Walter Laqueur, Confrontation: The Middle East and
World Politics (New York: Quadrangle, 1974), p, 237.
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The resolution passed at the meeting stated the fol
lowing:
Considering that the direct goal of the
current battle is the liberation of the
Arab territories occupied in the June 19^7
war and the recovery of the legitimate rights
of the Palestinian people in accordance with
the United Nations resolutions;
Considering that the United States is- the
principal and foremost source of the Israeli
power which has resulted in the present Is
raeli arrogance and enabled the Israelis to
continue to occupy our territories;
Recalling that the big industrial nations,
help, in one way or another to perpetuate
the status quo, though they bear a common
responsibility for implementing the United
Nations resolutions;
Considering that the economic situations
of many Arab oil producing countries does .
not justify raising oil production, though
they are ready to make such an increase in
production to meet the requirements of ma
jor consumer industrial nations that commit
themselves to cooperation with us for the
purpose of liberating our territories;
Decided that each Arab oil exporting country immediately cuts its production by a
recurrent monthly rate of no less than 5
percent to be initially counted on the vir
tual production of September, and then
ceforth on the last production figure un
til such a time as the international com
munity compels Israel to relinquish our
occupied territories or until the produc
tion of every individual country reaches
the point where its economy does not permit
any further reduction without detriment to
its national and Arab obligations.
Nevertheless, the countries that support
the Arabs actively and effectively or that
take important measures against Israel to
compel its withdrawal shall not be preju
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diced by this production cut and shall con
tinue to receive the same oil supplies that
they used to receive prior to the reduction.
Though the cut rate will be uniform in res
pect to every individual oil exporting coun
try, the decrease in the supplies provided
to the various consuming countries may well
be aggravated proportionately with their
support to and cooperation with the Israeli
enemy.
The.participants also recommend to the
countries party to this resolution that the
United States be subjected to the most se
vere cut proportionally with the quantities
of crude oil, oil derivatives and hydro
carbons that it imports from every exporting
country.
The participants also recommend that
this progressive reduction lead to the total
halt of oil supplies to the United States
from every individual country party to the
resolution.1
The decision reached at the conference for an ini
tial cut in production by a minimum of five percent with
an additional cut of five percent each month, was moderate
compared with the proposals that some of the Arab countries
were suggesting.

Iraq wanted the nationalization of all

American interests in the region.

Libya, Algeria and Syria

wanted total embargo to the West.

After a lengthy debate,

however, the more conservative wing led by Saudi Arabia pre2
'
vailed.
The meeting ended without a decision to impose an
embargo against any country.

Even though the clause at

....... J o r d a n J. Paust and Albert P. Blaustein, The Arab
Oil Weapon (New Yorks Oceana Publications, Inc., 1977)»
pp,
^Oil and Gas Journal. October 22, 1973*
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the end of the resolution stated that the United States
must be subjected to the most severe cut in oil exports and
that the progressive reduction in oil supplies should lead
to a total halt in Arab oil supplies to the U.S., it was
put more in the form of a recommendation than a decision.'*'
Saudi Arabia exercised a great deal of pressure on its fel
low Arab countries during the conference to avoid declaring
an embargo on the U.S.

This was intended to give the U.S.

time to re-evaluate its position and to react to the Arab
demands.
Meanwhile the Foreign Ministers of Saudi Arabia, Ku
wait, Algeria and Morocco came as envoys of the Arab world
for a meeting with President Nixon and Secretary of State
Henry Kissinger in Washington.

They were carrying a mes

sage from King Faisal and other heads of Arab oil produc
ing countries clearly stating that they '.'were under mounting
pressure from Arab belligerents to use their oil as a lever
against the

U .S ."

2.\

in retaliation for its support.of Israel.

However, while the Arab envoys were still in Washington
a State Department spokesman announced that the United
States was going to continue its military relationship with
Israel during this war.

3

In fact a military airlift to Is-

^Itayim, Op. Cit.. p, 91.
^Oil and Gas Journal, October 22,1973.
^The Washington Post. October 1?, 1973.
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rael was already in process, compensating.it for losses in
the first week and a half of the war.
On October 19t 1973» President Nixon announced that
he had asked Congress for immediate military assistance of
2.2 billion dollars to Israel in order "to achieve stabi
lity" in the area.
only one option.

King Faisal, therefore, was left with
On October 20, it was announced that "In

view of the increase of military aid to Israel, the Kingdom
of Saudi Arabia has decided to halt all oil exports to the
United States of America."'1'
The massive airlift of jets, tanks, arms and ammuni
tion to Israel while the fighting was still going on shaped
*

the outcome of the war to the advantage of the Israelis.
It led President Sadat to says "I fought Israel for eleven
2
days, but I was not ready to fight the United States."
The posture of the United States during the events of the
fourth Arab-Israeli war was the main reason behind King
Faisal's decision to join the more revolutionary Arab lead
ers in enforcing an embargo against it.
The enforcement of the cutback in oil production
and later of the embargo of oil to the United States was
followed unilaterally by all OAPEC nations with the excep-

■^Itayim, Op. Cit., p, 91.
Edward Ghareeb, "The US Arras Supply to Israel Dur
ing the War," Journal of Palestine Studies, Vol, III, No. 2
(Winter 197*0, p,ll4.
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tion of Iraq.

During the Kuwait meeting on October 17,

Iraq had opposed the policy of production cutbacks and in
sisted on punitive nationalization of the interests of those
countries that were helping Israel.

When the Iraqi delegate

failed to get the support of the other Arab oil countries,
he withdrew from the conference.

From then on, Iraq did

not attend any of the OAPEC meetings dealing with this cri
sis.

Iraq followed its own course in using oil as a po

litical lever.

Following its nationalization of the Ameri

can oil interests, it announced the nationalization of all
Dutch holdings in the Basrah Petroleum Company, as a "puni
tive measure against the Netherlands for its hostile stand
toward the Arab nation.1,1

It then followd the embargo a-

gainst the countries that were listed in the meetings by
the oil ministers, but rejected the policy of cutbacks and
2
supplied the non-embargoed states as usual.
The Saudi government under the direction of King
Faisal set a pattern for collective Arab action in the oil
policy: first when -it formally declared its production cut
back measures and second when it announced its oil embargo
against the United States.

Other Arab oil countries fol

1Ibrahim F.I.Shihata, "Destination Embargp of Arab
Oil: Its Legality Under International Law," American Journal
of International Law, Vol, 68, No. ^ (October 197*0* p. 595.
2
George Lenczowski, "The Oil Producing Countries,"
Daedalus, Vol. lO*!- (Fall, 19755* p. ©3.
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lowed the Saudi example.

Then on October 21, oil shipments

to the Netherlands were banned for "its hostile attitude
towards Arab rights and its pro-Israeli bias/'^including
allowing its territory to be used for the massive airlift
that was taking place from the U.S. to Israel.
Because no uniform method was adopted as to how to
treat the deducted crude oil quantities of the embargoed
countries, some producing countries found themselves at a
big disadvantage.

Saudi Arabia and Kuwait treated these

quantities incrementally to the general cutbacks, which
drove their cutback percentage to over 30 percent.

In an

attempt to clarify this ambiguity, a second meeting of Arab
Oil Ministers was held in Kuwait on November

5, 1973* At

this meeting it was decided that a common level of reduc
tion for all Arab oil producing countries would be set at
25 percent from the September level.

A further additional

reduction of 5 percent would follow in December.
One important outcome of the November meeting was
a decision tp designate as emissaries, the Oil Ministers
of Saudi Arabia and Algeria,

Sheikh Yamani and Belaid Abd-

elsalam’respectively, to tour major Western and industri
alized countries explaining the cutback and the embargo,
measures to the consuming nations directly.

It was hoped

that such a move would change Western public opinion in ...

"^Shihata, Op. Cit.. p. 595.
-Ibid.
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favor of the Arab cause.

The two Ministers had press con

ferences and meetings with influential groups in the West
and in Japan where they explained in detail the motives be
hind Arab oil diplomacy and their desire for a just settle
ment for the conflict.'1' Their tour coincided with full page
advertisements placed by OAPEC in major Western newspapers
explaining Arab action.

In the advertisement published in

the British newspaper the Guardian, OAPEC states:
The Arabs wish to make it plainly and ex
plicitly known,..thatthis embargo is not
intended in any way to castigate the peo
ples of the countries concerned, with whom
the Arabs wish to maintain the closest and
warmest friendly relations; but this em
bargo is indeed directed against the Govern
ments, or those responsible in the Govern
ments, for the anti-Arab policy....
A similar advertisement was placed in the Washington Post
under the headline "Letter To The American People" detail
ing the reasons behind the Arab policy.
The two meetings held in Kuwait in October and then
early November, 1973» outlined the basic boycott policy.
Then a series of meetings followed.

The purpose of these

sessions was to refine the boycott policy.

Thus there was

a meeting of Arab Oil Ministers in Vienna on November 18,
in Kuwait on December 8-9 and again on December 2^-25. An
other" refining" of the boycott policy was accomplished at

^■Ali, Op. Cit.. p. 113.
2
The Guardian, November 15» 1973*
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the Arab Summit meeting which convened in Algeria on No
vember 26-28.1

The decision reached at this meeting was

to embargo oil to Portugal, South Africa and Rhodesia for
their close collaboration with the Israelis.
By the end of 1973* the Saudis and the other members
of OAPEC had divided the countries of the world into three
major categories:
1. The most favored•‘0Tr~the friendly countries.
2. The neutral countries.
3. The unfriendly countries.
The most favored list of friendly countries included
all Arab countries, Islamic countries that import Arab oil,
all the African nations that severed their relations with
Israel, and also some Western countries like France, Spain,
England and later Belgium.

These countries were exempt

from the cutbacks and the embargo,and oil shipments was to
be continued to them as per September.1973 levels.
The unfriendly or hostile countries, who were aiding
Israel militarily or otherwise,were e.mbargoed.
they were to receive no oil at all.

That meant

These countries includ

ed the U.S., the Netherlands, and later Portugal, South
Africa, and Rhodesia.

The neutral countries were to receive

the oil available after the general cutbacks were applied.
To the Arab oil-producing nations, this categoriza-

^Lenczowski, Daedalus, On. Cit.. p. 66.
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?k
tion was imperative.

First they wanted to show their appre

ciation to the countries sympathetic to their cause by keep
ing their oil shipments as usual.

Further, they wanted to

"reply in kind" towards countries that were supporting Is
rael by denying Arab oil to them.

This was done in the

hope that such an action would discourage these countries
from pursuing pro-Israeli policies in the future.

They

could not have declared an embargo against the industrial
countries

since "an embargo to all Western countries would

have alienated Western Europe and Japan from the Arab cause'.'^
Thus this categorization seemed a logical path to follow.
By December, 1973* the OAPEC nations with the .Saudi
government acting once more as a pacesetter, showed signs
of relaxing their boycott policy.

The meeting held in Ku

wait on December 2^-25 by the Arab Oil Ministers resulted
in a decision to reduce the overall production cutback from
25 percent of the September level to 15 percent.

Even

though it was decided to keep the oil embargo against the
U.S. and the Netherlands, the meeting "noted with satisfac
tion the gradual shift in U.S. public opinion, an appreci
able section of which was beginning to understand the true
2
nature of the Arab problem and Israel's expansionist policy."
The efforts of the American Secretary of State Dr.

\)il and Gas Journal, October 22, 1973.
2Itayim, On. Cit., p. 9k.
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Henry Kissinger in his "shuttle diplomacy" and his ability
to reach an agreement on January 17* 197b leading to the dis
engagement of Egyptian and Israeli troops, brought further
hope for ending the oil boycott.

For weeks, following the

disengagement agreement, Saudi Arabia and Egypt began a ser
ies of intensive efforts to lift the embargo.
succeeded.

They finally

Thus on March 18, 197^» at the Arab Oil Minis

ters meeting in Vienna, the decision was reached.

Five

months almost to the day since the oil embargo was imposed
the OAPEC Ministers lifted the ban on oil sales to the U.S.
The statement issued by the Ministers noted the change in
",,,the American official policy as evidenced iately by the
recent political events" which "assumed a new dimension visa-vis the Arab-Israeli conflict." The statement noted fur
ther that:
Such a dimension, if maintained, will lead
America to assume a position which is more
compatible with the principle of what is
right and just toward the Arab occupied
territories and the legitimate rights of
the Palestinian people.1
In order to appease the Arab countries who were against lifting the embargo which were Algeria, Syria and
Libya, it was agreed that the decision will be reviewed in
two months.

If meanwhile the U.S. does not put enough pres

sure on Israel to bring about the separation of the Syrian

^The New York Times, March 19 * 1973.
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and the Israeli forces in the Golan Heights area, then the
embargo could be restored.

On May 29, 197*0 The Syrians

and the Israelis reached a troop separation agreement,there
by eliminating the possibility of restoring the embargo.
The restrictions placed on exports of oil, in the form of
cutbacks, were all ended beginning June 197*0

On July 10,

197*0 the ban on oil sales to the Netherlands was lifted.
Thus the oil crisis came to an end.
The Arab Oil Weapon: Was It Legal?
The actions of the Arab oil producers in reducing
their oil production, discriminating in oil exports and
the withholding of oil from the United States and other
consuming nations constituted economic measures aimed at
restoring control over Arab land occupied by Israel as well
as finding a solution for the Palestinian problem.
Questions have been raised concerning Arab actions.
Was the Arab oil weapon a justifiable measure, taken in
self-defense and therefore consistent with the requirements
of international law?1
Economic warfare is a game that all states -can and
do play from time to time.

The Arab oil policy in the 1973

■^James A. Boorman III, "Economic Coercion in inter
national Laws The Arab Oil Weapon and the Ensuing Juridi
cal Issues, "Journal of International Law and Economics,"
Vol. 9. Issue 2 (197*0, pp. 208-209.
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crisis was far from being a "weapon for blackmailing the
West," or a "threat to international peace."
intended to

Nor was it

threaten the "political independence" of the

industrial world.1

Rather it was employed to achieve a

solution for the Arab problem, a problem whi.a the inter
national community seemed reluctant to resolve.
It can be argued that the Arab oil embargo did not
violate customary international law.

The practice of states

and no less the United States, reveals many instances where
economic measures were used as an element of foreign policy:
The United, States Government has used high
ly coercive economic measures against other
states with little regard for the labels
attached,
...in both World Wars, the United
States participated in massive,economic
blockade measures which impacted severely
upon the targeted populations....
Countries that were considered "adjacent neutrals"
like Spain and Portugal were not allowed to receive oil
from the U.S. or other major powers during World War II.
Thus, economic coercion was used not only by belligerents
3
against each other but also by or against neutrals.
Professor Richard Gardner criticizes the adoption
of "an unduly.self-righteous attitude" on the issue of oil

^hihata, Op. Cit., p. 625.
^Boorman, Op. Cit., p. 212.
^Shihata, Op. Cit., p. 615.
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embargo.

He states that:
...the United States itself has been one
of the worst offenders in using trade
controls in ways which have adversely
affected other countries. As a result
of congressional pressures, the President
was given the authority to cut off aid
to countries trading with Cuba or North
Vietnam.

Professor Gardner gives another example of American
use of coercive economic measures by citing the amendments
adopted by the House of Representatives, to the trade bill
"denying Most Favored Nation treatment and trade credits
to the Soviet Union and other 'non-market economy' coun
tries until they grant free emigration to their citizens."
This action according to James Boorman "was taken princi
pally on behalf of Soviet Jews who wished to emigrate to
Israel.
The Arab oil embargo does not seem to be inconsist
ent with the Charter of the United Nations either. Article
2 (4) of the Charter states that member states "shall re
frain in their international relations' from the threat or
use of force against the territorial integrity or politi
cal independence of any state...."

This principle of the

illegality of the threat or use of force does not touch

"Siichard N, Gardner, "The Hard Road to World Order,
Foreign Affairs, Vol. 52, No. 3 (April 197*0» p. 576.
2Ibid.
^Boorman, On. Cit., p. 218.
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even remotely on the use of economic and political pressure.
Taking the words in their common sense meaning, it is clear
that the prohibition of the use or threat of force applies
only to physical armed force.
The Arab oil embargo was not employed as a threat
toward the territorial integrity or political independence
of any nation.

Its usage seems reasonable and even proper

in the course of events during the October 1973 war.

To

the Arabs, the United States and the Netherlands violated
the rules of neutrality and of international law.

Neutral

states (as the United States and the Netherlands were sup
posed to be during the October war) should remain impartial
towards the belligerents.

A neutral state must abstain

from providing war materials or weaponary of any kind. Nei
ther does a neutral power allow the transport of war sup
plies over its territory.1

Such actions led only to the

strengthening of the Israeli military position against the
Arab countries during the war.
By .declaring the oil embargo, the Arab countries
felt they had used their right to employ economic sanctions
against countries that violated their obligations of neut
rality in the Arab-Israeli conflict.

Further, they were

exercising their "sovereign right" to use their natural
resources in a way that was beneficial to them.

This is

"Sshihata, Op. Cit., pp. 6l*J— 6l5.
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in accordance with many U.N. resolutions, the most perti
nent of which is resolution 3175 passed just two months
after the October 1973 war.

This resolution reaffirmed

the right of the Arab states to permanent sovereignty over
their natural resources including those in lands held by
1
Israel.
Voices were heard in the West, including that of
«-

«h-

-

the American Secretary of State Henry Kissinger, denouncing
the Arab oil boycott and labelling it "blackmail."

George

Ball, who was Under Secretary of State in the Kennedy and
Johnson Administrations observes the irony in the double
standard:
Our outrage at the recent oil embargo,
with even Secretary of State darkly
muttering about blackmail, has the sour
sound of sanctimony in the chancelleries
of other nations.
We Americans, after all, have been lead
ing practitioners of economic sanctions
to advance our own political-and even
moral-policies....
The question that the Arabs ask: Why is it black
mail when they use their oil power to further their own
national interests and it is not blackmail when the West
resorts to the same measures to achieve its own intended
results?

If anything, the Arabs have learnt the

■^Boorman, Op. Cit. , p. 21*h
^The New York Times. March 21, 197^.
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of important resources as instruments of political pressure
"by copying the example of the West.1
Up to the October war, the Arab states were pumping
their oil at a much higher rate than their economies requir
ed, but it was done to satisfy the interests of the indus
trialized nations.

While OAPEC oil was continuing to flow

to the West and to add to its prosperity, Arab demands for
a just settlement for their problem were ignored.

Their

use of the oil weapon represented the last straw after all
else had failed.

Studying it in the context in which it

was used one can easily conclude that the Arab employment
of the oil weapon is a proper and a lawful measure,aimed
at the protection of Arab interests.

^ u s i f A. Sayigh, "Oil in Arab Developmental and Po
litical Strategy: An Arab View,"in Arab Oil, Op. Cit,, p.258
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Throughout its history, oil has "been a political
resource par excellence.
Enrico Mattei
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CHAPTER IV
IMPACT OF THE ARAB OIL EMBARGO
The use of oil as a political weapon in the October
1973 events came as a blow to the United States, Western
Europe and Japan.

At the time of the enforcement of the

Arab oil boycott, Europe was importing 65 percent of its
oil requirement from the Arab world.

Japan used 50 per

cent of its petroleum energy from Arab sources and the
United States 10 percent.^- At the height of the crisis
the total cutback in Arab oil production reached almost
^ million barrels a day.

2

This amounted to approximately

20 percent of the September prewar level.
Japan During The Crisis:
Japan vulnerabilities were immediately apparent.
In 1973» Japan was importing 99 percent of its crude oil,
about half of that amount came from the OAPEC nations.
During the crisis, the policy of production cutbacks was
applied to the flow of Arab oil destined to Japan.

The

OAPEC nations decision to impose the gradual cutbacks

^Ali, Op. Cit. , p, 112.
^The New York Times, October 26, 1973.
83

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

84
toward

Japan was a result of its self-styled neutrality

on the issue of occupied Arab land and the Palestinian
problem.

When the OAPEC decision was announced, a feeling

of panic spread over the country.

It was feared that the

Japanese industries would be greatly jeopardized.

Accord

ing to one Japanese expert, OAPEC's declaration hit Japan
as a "thunderbolt from the blue sky."1
Japan looked to the United States for guidance as
to the posture it should take, during this crisis.

The

American Secretary of State Henry Kissinger advised the
Japanese government not to give in to OAPEC's pressure.
However, rumors were spreading in the Japanese official
circles of a Kissinger-Israel conspiracy.

The proponents

of this theory were convinced that the American leaders
were glad to see "the foreign-exchange reserves of Japan
and West Germany drained off to the United States via the
2
OPEC nations."
Coupled with this theory, was a suspicion
growing in Japanese circles, that the American maj9r oil
companies were diverting oil destined for Jajpan to the
3
U.S.
Japanese officials began to re-evaluate the coun
try's position independently of the U.Si, and in the light
of their national self interest.

^ o s h i Tsurumi, "Japan," Daedalus, Vol. 104, No. 4
(Pall, 1975), P. 123.

2

Ibid., p. 124.

3Ibid.
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On November 22, 1973, "the Chief Cabinet-Secretary,
Susumu Nikaido, on behalf of the Tanaka Cabinet, issued a
statement to the press that meant tilting Japan's neutral
ity toward Arab demands.

The statement called for Israel's

withdrawal from all occupied Arab territories and that the
"Just rights of the Palestinians, based on the UN.Charter,"
should be recognized and respected.'1' Furthermore, the
statement noted that Japan was*closely observing the situa
tion, and that its policy toward Israel would be reconsider2
ed in the light of future developments.
However, the Japanese statement did not result in
an immediate lifting of the restrictions on Arab oil des
tined for Japan.

The Japanese Deputy Prime Minister was

sent on a good will mission aimed at removing the restric
tions.

This mission was very successful and Japan was put

on the list of the "friendly countries" even while the
emissary was still in the Middle East,
Japan since the 1973 October war has continued to
show support for the Arab cause, and particularly on the
Palestinian question.

The Japanese permanent representa

tive to the United Nations has often emphasized that "the
Palestinian question was central to a resolution of Middle

^Kazushige Hirasawa, "Japan's Tilting Neutrality,"
in Oil,The Arab-Israeli Dispute, and the Industrial World,
ed,, J.C. Hurewitz( Boulder, Westview Press, 1976)» P» 1^0.
2Ibid.
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East problems and that there could be no settlement until
the Palestinian issue was resolved according to the prin
ciples of self-determination under the UN Charter.'•'1
The Arab oil boycott policy of 1973 had led Japan
to assume a diplomatic position independent of that of the
United States, a position that is more compatible with its
national interests and its economic needs.

Since the Octo

ber war Japan has abandoned its previous neutral stand and
is pursuing a more active role in trying to reach a just
and permanent settlement for the Arab-Israeli conflict.
The American Response:
The Arabs

directed the force of their embargo

against the United States because they firmly believed that
Israel's policies toward occupied Arab land and the Pales
tinian issue could not be maintained without the strong
American support it has received over the years.

Public

opinion generally runs high in the United States in favor,
of Israel.

This does not nepessarily stem from the knowrr

ledge of the average American of the details surrounding
the Arab-Israeli dispute.

It is perhaps more of a reflec

tion of the stand that the American government had been
maintaining since President Truman put the full weight of

^Ibid., p. 1^6.
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the U.S. behind the establishment of the State of Israel
in 19^8.

In the words of one analyst, "the foreign policy

opinions of many Americans are responses to cues emanating
from the President and other public officials.1,1 Even
when the availability of Arab oil is directly coupled with
the American support for Israel, the prevailing public •
2
opinion is still favorable to the Jewish state.
A lot of the Israeli support in the U.S. seems to
be coming from the Congress which has been looked upon as
"the bastion of pro-Israel sentiment."

One of the most

powerful influences on the Congress has been the Jewish or
what is sometimes referred to as the "Israeli Lobby." Dur
ing the October 1973 war and while the U.S. was searching
for a solution for ending the war, Senator J.W. Fullbright,
said that the U.S. should force Israel into a settlement
that was in accordance with Security Council Resolution
2^2, only to add that because Israeli "influence is domi
nant" in the Congress, he does not believe it can be
3
achieved.
Senator James Abourezk, has also spoken of
the dominance of the "Israeli Lobby."

According to him,

"The Israeli lobby is the most powerful and pervasive

^David Garnham, "The Oil Crisis and U.S. Attitudes
Toward Israel," in Arab Oil: Impact on the Arab Countries
and Global Implications, pp. 297-299.
2Ibid. ,

p.

300.

^Bryson Op. Cit., p. 263.
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foreign influence that exists in American politics."1
In the weeks following the Arab oil embargo, the
United States had shown an interest in bringing the hostil
ities to an end and in pursuing a peaceful settlement in
the region.

In this policy, oil seemed to be a major

constituent in the push for peace in the Middle East.

The

American Secretary of State, Henry Kissinger, took the ini
tiative during the weeks following the end of the October
1973 war to conduct the disengagement talks between the
warring parties.

In his highly personalized efforts, or

what came to be known as "Shuttle Diplomacy," Dr, Kissinger
shuttled back and forth between the capitals of Syria,
Egypt and Israel in order to reach troops

disengagement

agreements in the hope-that the. Arabs will put an end to
their oil embargo against the United States.

Since the

October war, the U.S. has been trying to play a more evenhanded role in the Arab-Israeli conflict.

To the Arabs,

the American efforts are still far from meeting Arab demands
but they nonetheless appear to have "assumed a new dimen
sion" and seem to be a step in the right direction.
On the domestic scene, the response of the American
government to the oil embargo imposed by the Arabs, was an
appeal by President Nixon to the people of the U.S.to.rally

^The Middle East: U.S. Policy, Israel, Oil and the
Arabs (Washington D.C., Congressional Quarterly, Fourth
Edition, 1979), p. 90.
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around a "major national endeavor" on the same levels as
the projects that produced the atomic bomh and sent a man
to the moon:
Let us set as our national goal, in the
spirit of Apollo and with the determina
tion of the Manhattan Project, that by
the end of this decade, we will have de
veloped the potential to meet our own
energy needs without depending on any,,,
foreign energy sources.!
President Nixon went on to ask the nation to "face
up to a very stark "act. We are heading toward the most
acute shortages of energy since World War II," and called
on citizens to use "less heat, less electricity, less gas
oline."

He called this program '!Project Independence" and

called on the nation to devote its efforts "in this bi
centennial era" to it with the goal of achieving self-suffi
ciency in oil by 198O .2
On the international level, President Nixon was
also calling for rallying of the forces of the consuming
nations to deal with the energy shortage.

On January 9.

1974, President Nixon asked the Foreign Ministers of the
major oil-consuming nations to attend a meeting in Washing
ton to discuss world energy problems.

The purpose of the

meeting according to the President, was to "establishr a
task force" to"formulate a consumer action program." This

^ a c t s On File. Vol. 33.No. 1?23(Nqv. 4-10,1973)P,923*

2

Ibid.. p. 924.
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program would "deal with the explosive growth of global
energy demand" and would "accelerate the coordinated devel
opment of new energy sources."1
Thirteen Foreign Ministers representing the Euro-

2

pean Economic Community, as well as Japan, Norway, Canada
and the United States gathered in Washington on February
11, 197^, in response to President Nixon's invitation* This
consumer's conference which was an attempt to strengthen
the Atlantic Alliance under American leadership, did not
prove to be a success.

There had been already a growing

rift between the United States and Western European con
cerning the Arab-Israeli conflict and the conference seem
ed to intensify it.
At the height of the U.S. airlift of weapons and
military assistance to Israel, Western Europe refused to
allow the U.S. to lift arms and aid from American mili
tary bases on European territories.

The only exception

among the European nations was the Netherlands whose policy
resulted in the embargo of Arab oil supplies destined to
it.

The European allies felt that the United States per

haps could maintain its pro-Israel‘
i position because the
American dependency on oil from Arab states was much less

^Tacts On File,Vol. 3^.No. 173l(Jan. 1-12,197*0 , p.l.

2

The European Community (EEC) consists of nine mem
bers: Britain, France, Italy, W, Germany, Belgium,Denmark,
Ireland, Luxemburg and the Netherlands.
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significant than theirs.

They on the other hand,were high

ly dependent on Arab oil and had to worry about their oil
supplies and the effect that a shortage or an embargo could
play on their economies.

This rift had even widened fur

ther, when President Nixon placed all American military
forces on alert on October 25,1973» in response to what
was believed as the Soviet Union's interest in sending
Russian troops to the Middle East.

The U.S. it seemed,

did not choose to consult its allies on this highly sen
sitive matter.

The Western European nations were angered

that this situation of a possible American-Russian con
frontation was not relayed to them in time.'*'

What also

contributed to the breach in American-European relations
was the fact that Dr, Kissinger's shuttle diplomacy between
Washington, Moscow, the Arab and the Israeli capitals, was
being conducted without the European allies' consultation.
This strain in the American-European relations was
felt during the February 197** consumers conference.

Michel

Jobert, the French Foreign Minister, criticized the confer
ence and accused the U.S. of using energy matters only as
" a pretext."

The real purpose,Jobert stated,was "a polit

ical desire by the U.S. to dominate the relationships of
2
Western Europe and Japan."
The French were suspicious

Bryson, Op. Cit., p. 282.
2Facts On File,Vol. 3*0 N o ,1736-. (Feb.l6, 197*0. p. 97-
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of the American intentions.

They believed that "the Washing

ton conference had been called to reassert U.S. leadership
over disintegrating alliance affairs, and to create some
new interlocking machinery to tie European energy plans and
activities to American resources...."1
Since the 197^ conference! France has pursued a pol
icy of bilateral agreements with Arab oil-producing coun
tries offering them weapons and technology in exchange for
2
oil.
Other European nations have followed the French ex
ample.

On March

197^! the Common Market countries

agreed to:
,,,authorize economic and technical co
operation with 20 Arab states independ
ently of the United States. This action
was what prompted President Nixon's out- ..
burst in Chicago on March 15. He warned
that economic 'hostility' in Europe would
bolster arguments in Congress for with~
drawing American troops from the continent.-5
Ironically, the U.S. which seemed shocked at the
European countries behavior since it was a sign of defec
tion from the existing alliance, had itself concluded
several bilateral agreements with Arab oil-producing countries

dealing with trade, investment and technology.

h

Werner J, Feld, "West European Foreign Policies:
The Impact of the Oil Crisis," Orbis, Volume 22, No. 1,
(Spring,1978), p. 71.

2

Ibid., p. 70.

3Ali, On. Cit.. p. 139.
Feld, Op. Cit., p. 70.
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The European Nations and Oil Diplomacy:
The initial reaction in Europe to the Arab oil boy
cott was one of panic.

West European nations depended on

Middle Eastern oil for over 65 percent of their total en
ergy consumption.1

It was feared that European industries

would slacken for lack of fuel and the consequences would
be a deep recession.

Europe was caught off guard and re

acted with confusion and inconsistency.
The Dutch government accused Syria and Egypt of
breaking the de facto truce in the October 1973 war, where
as the British placed a prohibition on arms sales to the
2
countries involved in the war.
When an embargo was de
clared by the OAPEC. nations.,against .the .Netherlands , the .
other European countries refused to come to its assistance.
The Dutch government had allowed the U.S. to use its bases
in the arms lift to Israel, while the rest of the European
countries declined to do so for fear of antagonizing the
Arabs.

The Netherlands asked its European brethren for

help in the form of oil sharing but the British and the
French stood firm against such assistance. The French gov-

■^Benjamin Shwadran, Middle East Oil: Issues and Problems (Cambridge, Mass: Schenkman Publishing Co., Inc.,
T 9 7 7 L p. 87.
% a n s Maull, "The Strategy of Avoidence: Europe's
Middle East Policies after the October War" in Oil, The
Arab-Israeli Dispute and the Industrial World, ed., J.C.
Hurewitz (Boulder: Colorado, Westview Press, 1976),p, 117.
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maintained that it was the oil producers prerogative to
sell their oil to the countries of their choice, and since
the French government was interested in maintaining with
the oil countries "a confident, balanced and lasting re
lationship," it could not offer any help to the Dutch gov
ernment.1

In England, the response was similar.

Sir Alec

Douglas-Home stated that it was in Europe's interest to
bring pressure on Israel and that its efforts should be
concentrated on this path rather than pursuing other channels that could be jeopardizing to European interest.

2

The German government refused to co-operate public
ly with the American arms airlift to Israel, but it is be
lieved that such co-operation was going on secretly.

It

was only after the Arab-Israeli hostilities ended, that
the German authorities strongly protested the loading of
American arms on an Israeli ship in the northern part of
3
West Germany.
The Arab oil policy toward Western Europe during
the crisis manifested itself in placing a total embargo of
oil shipments to the Netherlands and a gradual cutback in
oil production aimed at the "neutral countries."

In No

vember 197^» the production cutbacks reached 25 percent

^Laqueur, Confrontation, Op. Cit., p. 2^3.
2Ibid., p. Zkk.
3
Maull, Op. Cit,, p. 117.
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from their pre-war levels, with 5 percent further reduc
tion designated for the month of December.

France and

Britain were placed on the list of the "friendly nations"
and their oil shipments were flowing as usual.

The OAPEC

nations were hoping that their oil boycott would produce
a shift in the European stand toward the Arab-Israeli con
flict.

This in turn would

pressure the Israelis to change

their stance.
The reduction of oil supplies to the "neutral" Euro
pean states and the total embargo on oil shipments to the
Netherlands led to a serious situation within the European
Community.

The Europeans soon became aware of the reali

ties of the oil power and the vulnerability of their own
energy supplies.

Their reaction was quick.

Less than

three weeks following the enforcement of the oil boycott,
a statement was approved by the Foreign Ministers of the
Nine Members of the European Economic Community detailing
their position on the conflict in the Middle East.

Meet

ing in Brussels on November 5-6, 1973 (two days following
the Arab Oil Ministers announcement in Kuwait of their de
cision for a production cutback of 25 percent with an addi
tional five percent every month in the future), the Euro
pean Ministers of the Nine specified their intention as
to evaluate the economic and political implications of the
October war.

Their declaration, however, endorsing U.N.

resolution 2^2 "as a point of departure", dealt solely with
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the political implications of the war.^
Nine Ministers

It stated that the

consider that a settlement for the Arab-Is-

raeli impasse should be based on the following:
1. The inadmissibility of the acquistion
of territory by force.
2. The need for Israel to end the territori
al ' occupation which it had maintained
since the conflict of 196?.
3. Respect for the sovereignty and terri
torial integrity and independence of
every state in the area and their right
to live in peace within secure and recog
nized boundaries.
4. Recognition that in the establishment
of a just and lasting peace, account
must be taken of the legitimate rights
of the Palestinians.
The resolution did represent a major change in the
attitude of the European Community toward the Arab-Israeli
issue.

To call on Israel to withdraw to its June 4, 1967

borders and to recognize that the Palestinians must be in
cluded in the settlement, was a marked shift in the Euro
pean policies toward the Arabs.

The use of oil power

definitely resulted in a sensitivity and a speedy reaction
among the European countries.
Even though the decision reached was unanimous, it
did not necessarily mean that it reflected the national

^■Romano Prodi and Alberto Clo, "Europe",
Vol. 104, No. 4 (Falll, 1975), p. 106.

Daedalus

2

Quoted in full in Moore, Op. Cit., pp. 1192-1193.
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policy of each and every member of the Nine toward the ArabIsraeli dispute.1

Some members of the European Community

had tried to play a more even handed policy in the area
even before the 1973 October war, but not all.
The French policy has been less pro-Israeli and more
pro-Arab since the 1967 June war.

This policy was original

ly formulated by Charles De Gaulle, but was maintained by
his successors, George Pompidou and the present President
2
Valery Giscard d'Estaing.
Wanting to pursue their own
national interest in addition to a desire to play a signifi
cant role, in the solution to the Arab-Israeli conflict, the
French had abandoned their previous pro-lsraeli line and
adopted a policy of co-operation with the Arabs.
Germany is another country, member of the Nine, that
has moved closer to the Arabs.

Since the forties, the Ger

mans have displayed a moral commitment to the Jewish statedue to the annihilation campaign that Hitler directed
against the Jews.

However, with the arrival of Willy Brandt

to. power in 1969, there began a push for good relations with
both, Arabs and Israelis.

The Brandt government interpret

ed the Security Council Resolution 2^2 as meaning the total
withdrawal of Israeli forces from all Arab territories
occupied in the 19^7 war, a position which the Arab nations

"^Maull, On. Cit. . p. 119.
2Ibid.. p. 120.
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have always maintained.

In the seventies, the German at

titude seemed to move from the unconditional support it
lent to Israel in virtually all its policies, to a firm
support for its existence hut not necessarily "based on the
extended boundaries that Israel now controls.1
Britain has also shown a shift toward meeting Arab
demands.

During the American airlift to Israel at the

height of the October war, Britain declined the use of
its bases to the Americans in their airlift to Israel. It
also declared an embargo on deliveries of arms and spares
to all parties involved, in the fighting.

This shift to

ward a better understanding of the Arab position seems
to continue with the present government of Mrs, Margaret
Thatcher.
On the other hand,Holland has maintained its proIsraeli policy over the years.

During the 1973 October

war events, the Dutch government followed a policy of
high inconsistency.

At first, it condemned the Syrians

and Egyptians for violating the de facto truce following
the outbreak of the hostilities.

Later, it was among

the members of the European Community that called upon the
Israelis to withdraw from Arab land; it also sent Dutch
envoys to the Arab oil-producing nations in the hope that

1
Ibid. ,

p.

122.
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the oil embargo enforced against it would be lifted.

The

ban on oil sales to the Netherlands lasted approximately
nine months before it was lifted.
The reaction in the Arab oil-producing nations to
the European Community statement was very favorable.

The

EEC new stance marked "a point scored by collective Arab
oil diplomacy."1

In response to the European jesture, the

Arab Oil Ministers meeting in Vienna on November 18, sus
pended their decision (taken two weeks earlier) to cut back
the supplies of oil destined to Europe by an additional
5 percent.

Then in December, the total percentage cutback

was reduced from 25 percent to 15 percent.

Upon ending

the embargo to the U.S., the OAPEC nations decided to re
sume meeting the petroleum needs of each of Italy, Belgium
and West Germany, in full.

This decision meant that they

were reclassified among the "friendly countries" in appre
ciation for the position they took during the war.
The growing dependence on Arab oil has forced the
European states since the 1973 crisis to become more in
volved in the Arab-Israeli dispute and to try to reach a
solution that would lead to a lasting peace in the Middle
East.

During their June Summit this past summer in Venice,

Italy, the Nine Members of the European Community initi-

^enczowski, Daedalus, Op. Cit., p, 66.
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ated an audacious Middle East proposal for a settlement
of theArab-Israeli conflict.

The European

declaration

on the Middle East stated:
,,,the time has come to promote the recogni
tion and implementation of the two principles
universally accepted by the international
community: the right to existence and to
security of all the states in the region,
including Israel, and justice for all the
peoples, which implies the recognition of
the legitimate rights of the Palestinian
people.
Also:
A just solution must finally be found to the
Palestinian problem, which is not simply one
of refugees. The Palestinian people which
is conscious of existing as such, must be
placed in a position by an appropriate pro
cess defined within the framework of the
comprehensive peace settlement, to exercise
fully its right.to self-determination.
Also:
The achievement of these objectives requires
the involvement and support of all the par
ties concerned in the peace settlement which
the Nine are endeavoring to promote in keep
ing with the principles formulated in the
declaration referred to above. These prin
ciples apply to all the parties concerned,
and thus the Palestinian people and to the
Palestinian Liberation Organization, which
will have to be associated with the nego
tiations .
In addition, the declaration noted:
The Nine recognize the special importance of
the role played by the question of Jerusalem
for all the parties concerned. The Nine
stress that they will not accept any uni
lateral initiative designed to change the
status of Jerusalem and that any agreement
on the city’s status should guarantee free
dom of access of everyone to the holy places.
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The Nine stressed furthers
...the need for Israel to put an end to the
territorial occupation which it has main
tained since the conflict of 19^7 > as it has
done for part of Sinai. They are deeply
convinced that the Israeli settlements, as
well as modifications in population and
property in the occupied Arab territories,
are illegal under international law.1
This new EEC position signalled according to the
London Times, 'I a historic shift" in European policy to
ward the conflict by bringing the Palestine Liberation
Organization into the picture

of a lasting peace in the

region.2
This bold declaration was met with strong criticism
from the United States.

President Carter was unwilling in

an election year-to pressure the Israelis for concessions
on Palestinian rights and on giving up the rest of occupied
3
Arab land.
He was still putting his full support behind
the Camp David Accord signed between Israel and Egypt last
year.

To the Europeans, the Accord did not result in a sig

nificant break in the search for peace in the region.

The

new initiative independent of the American position, re
affirms the deep fissure between the U.S. and Europe brought
about partly by the advent of Arab oil diplomacy.

^Text was printed in full in the New York Times,
June 14, 1980.
2
The London Times, June 14, 1980.
3
The Christain Science Monitor, June 18, 1980.
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We are capable of increasing oil production...but
we have demands in return for that. First and foremost,
we want the United States to throw all its weight into the
process of reaching a just settlement of the Middle East
crisis.
Crown Prince Fahd,
Saudi Arabia

102
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CHAPTER V
CONCLUSION
The Arab oil embargo has been clearly successful
in breaking the stalemate over occupied Arab land and the
Palestinian problem.

The question is often asked if there

would be another oil embargo by the Arabs in the event of
another war?

All indications seem to show that this would

be the case.

It is doubtful that the European Community

members would be subjected to such an embargo in the event
of its happening.

The target will be mainly the United

States as many in the Arab circles, feel that the U.S. has
not put nearly enough pressure on Israel since 1973*

Even

if the conservative Arab leaders of some oil-producing
countries are reluctant to declare another embargo, they
might have to yield to the growing pressure of the masses
inside their countries as well as to the pressures from
the more revolutionary Arab oil-producing countries. Late
ly, voices are being heard in the Arab world raising the
possibility of using Arab oil in the 1980s as a political
lever to pressure the U.S. on Arab Jerusalem, the occupied
territories and the Palestinian problem.1

Such voices

William Quandt, "The Middle East Crises," Foreign
Affairs,Vol. 58, No.3<(Winter, 1980), p. 553.
103
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are often heard in such Arab oil countries as Libya and
Iraq and must be reckoned with.
The possibility of another Middle East war is very
real. In spite of the American role in the Camp David
Agreement and its active participation in bringing the
Egyptian and the Israelis together, Arab circles still
feel that the United States is still maintaining its "spe
cial relationship" with Israel.

The Camp David Accord has

been rejected by all Arab countries with the exception of
course, of Egypt, the only Arab country to enter into peace
negotiations with Israel.

To the Arabs any agreement for

a permanent and lasting peace will have to include the
very sensitive issue of the Old City

of Jerusalem, the

rest of occupied Arab land, and the Palestinians.

The

Camp David Agreement falls short of meeting these objec
tives.

In fact this Agreement has so angered the Arabs

that it has been termed another "Balfour Declaration."
In the case of a renewed round of Arab-Israeli war,
The American government is likely to once more extend its
support to the Israelis.

This is in turn will most like

ly lead to another oil e'mbargo against the U.S.

With the

surfacing of the oil weapon once more, the question is ask
ed:

Will the United States resort to force to ensure its

accessibility of Arab oil for its fueling needs?
At the height of the October 1973 oil crisis, the
American Secretary of State Henry Kissinger, affirmed on

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

November 21, 1973. that the United States would not submit
to Arab pressure.

Threats of a military takeover of the

Arab oil fields were sent' in a subtle but unmistakable lan
guage.

Kissinger stated that if the Arabs "attempt to deal

with us by making a series of specific demands, backed up
by economic pressures," then the U.S. will resist.

Fur

thermore, if the "pressures continue unreasonably and in
definitely," the U.S. will consider counter-measures, the
Secretary of State stated.^
was swift and firm.

The reaction of Saudi Arabia

The Saudi Oil Minister, Sheikh Yamani

threatned that if the U.S. takes any counter-measures,
Saudi Arabia would escalate its production cutback from
the 25 percent that was enforced at the end of November
1973 to 80 percent of its total oil production.

He went

further to say that if the U.S. resorts to a military in
vasion, then the Saudis would immediately blow up their
oil fields.2
Two years later, Kissinger reiterated his threat.
In an interview with Business Week Magazine, he responded
to a question on possible American intervention against
the oil producers by saying: "This would be a very danger
ous course."

Then he added: "I am not saying there is no

circumstance where we would not use force.

But it is one

•^The Economist. December 1, 1973*
2Ibid.
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thing to use it in the case of a dispute over price and
i t ’s another where there is some form of strangulation of
the industrial world."1
The remarks of Dr, Kissinger were picked up by ex
perts and analysts all over the country.

Articles were

written in Commentary and Harper Magazines, about seizing
Arab oil, and the best way to do it.

In his article in

Commentary, Robert Tucker, a Professor of Political Sci
ence at John Hopkins University, stated that the question
of the feasibility of military intervention should be con
sidered by the U.S. and not ruled out automatically.

He

argues a case for the taking over the H-00 mile strip that
"extends from Kuwait down along the coastal region of Sau
di Arabia to Qatar.

It is this mostly shallow coastal

strip...that provides 40 per cent of present OPEC produc2
tion and that has by far the world's largest reserves."
In answer to the possibility that the Arabs would blow up
their oil fields, Professor Tucker stated that this is not
a major deterrent since American technology could bring
them to a working order in a few weeks.
This same argument representing the proponents for
the use of military power to counter oil power,was reflect-

Business Week, January 13, 1975.

2

Robert W. Tucker,"Oils The Issue of American Inter
vention," Commentary, Vol. 59. No, 1 (January 1975)» p.25*
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ed in the Harper's Magazine article titled? "Seizing Arab
Oils A Bluepring for Fast and Effective Action."^

It is

believed that the author of this article using an assumed
name was actually detailing a plan prepared by none other
than the Pentagon itself.

The goal detailed in this arti-

cle is not. only to seize Arab oil but to also break OPEC.
The area suggested for takeover is the Saudi oil fields
since "fortunately, those fields are not only prolific but
3

are also concentrated in a small area...."^

The author

continues by giving a blueprint for the strategy and tac
tics that should be employed in this venture

that in his

words "must be done,"
The reaction of the Arab world to these threats was
one of anger and condemnation.

Oil producers vowed not

oi.^y to destroy their fields but to also fight back against
any foreign invasion.
Rather than consider the possibility of another oil
embargo and the possibility or the practicality of an Ameri
can military intervention, perhaps the U.S. efforts should
be directed toward putting forth intensified efforts in
search for peace in the Middle East.

There is no doubt

Miles Ignotus,"Seizing Arab Oil? A Blueprint for
Fast and Effective Action,V Harper's .: March. 1975.
2Ibid., p. 50.
3Ibid., p. 51.
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that the situation is highly explosive and hostilitiescould erupt at any time bringing with them another round
of problems and hardship for every one in the region.
In political terms, Israel has become isolated even
among its traditional allies.

With the United States ex

cluded, the Jewish state is running short of friends now
adays.

The question that is asked in the Arab world as

well as in many European countries: Is the Israeli govern
ment headed by Menahim Begin interested in reaching peace
with its Arab neighbors or is it more working toward an
other round of hostilities in the region?
The Israeli actions as far as building more Jewish
settlements on occupied Arab land and the recent annexa
tion of Jerusalem, declaring it the "undivided capital of
Israel," have led to sharp criticism from friends and foes
alike.

From December of last year, the Israeli intentions

toward the "united Jerusalem" position became clearer; the
Israelis began a move toward seizing 350 acres of Arab
land in order to build a road in north Jerusalem.1

Then

later in March 1980, with what the Christain Science Moni
tor called " a sense of timing that had American negoti2
ators banging their heads against Washington walls, ”
Israel announced its intention to take also about 1,000

^ h e Christain Science Monitor, August 5» 1980.
2Ibid.•
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acres of predominately Arab owned Jerusalem land in order
to build a new settlement.1

The passing of the bill in the

Israeli Knesset on July30, 1980, declaring Jerusalem as
"united" and the "eternal capital" of Israel has led to a
further isolation of the Jewish state.
Israel's actions are also leading to a growing world
wide support for the Palestinians.

On July 22, 1980, the

U.N. General Assembly passed a resolution calling on Israel
to begin an unconditional withdrawal from the occupied Arab
territories by November 15, 1980 and for the formation of
a Palestinian state.

According to the Christain Science

Monitor, Israel is making a grave mistake by following
these policies.

It noteds "The more stubborn Israel's pol

icies, become,, the more certain it can be of its own growing
isolation- and of mounting world support for the Palestin
ians."2
The situation in the Middle East today is a highly
dangerous and explosive one.

If left unresolved it may

push the region and perhaps the whole.world into total de
struction.

In all probability, Arab oil will play a major

role if another war erupts.

Oil and politics have become

inseparable and are likely to continue to be so.

The West

ern dependence on Arab oil is at an all times high,especial

1Ibid.
2
The Christain Science Monitor. July 31, 198O.
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ly following the Iranian revolution and the disruption of
the Iranian oil exports.

If enforced again, the oil weapon

would still not he used as an instrument for blackmailing
the U.S. hut rather in the interest of solving the ArabIsraeli problem.

When used in 1973* the Arab oil weapon

was not aimed at the disruption or the causing of irrepa-r
rable damage to the industries and the economies of the
West.

Rather, it was enforced somewhat in resignation and

even perhaps in sorrow, after all efforts for drawing the
world attention to the seriousness of the problem,

had

failed.
In assessing the effectiveness of the Arab oil em
bargo as it was employed in the October 1973 events, one
can easily say that it was markedly successful.

It has

induced Western Europe and Japan to abandon their previous
positions and to seek more active roles in the solution of
the Arab-Israeli conflict.

Even in the U.S., more and

more voices are calling for a solution that would take in
to account all the parties involved, a solution that would
b,e just and acceptable to everyone in the region.
The use of Arab oil as a political weapon was meant
to draw the attention of the world to a threat as well as
an opportunity.

The opportunity to build a peace that is

lasting and just, or the threat of leaving the situation as
it is and perhaps engulfing the world, sooner or later in
catastrophy.
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The role of oil and politics to the Arab oil produc
ers has become intertwined.

Since by supplying their oil,

at a rate much higher than their own interest dictates, they
are enhancing the economic and political power of the West,
the Arab oil nations expect some co-operation in return.
The Arabs will continue using their oil power for political
purposes until the Arab-Israeli problem is solved.
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